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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HEALTH 
Santa Monica, California 
October 7, 1980 
CHAIRMAN ART TORRES: Good morning. I'd like to intro-
duce the members of the Committee who are with us here this morning. 
On my far left is Assemblyman Torn Bates, who represents the Oakland/ 
Berkeley Area and who chairs the Subcommittee on Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities. To his right is Assemblywoman Leona 
Egeland, who unfortunately will be leaving us after this term in 
the Legislature, and she presently serves as Chairperson of the 
Assembly Ways and Means Committee #1, which is concerned with the 
budget for the Health and Welfare for the state. To her right is 
Shirley Guido who is the secretary to the Subcommittee on Mental 
Health and Developmental Disabilities. To my right is Joan 
Amundson who is the principal consultant to the Subcommittee on 
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities and also serves as a 
consultant to the Assembly Health Committee. To her right is 
Assemblyman Dave Stirling who is the author of AB 2727, which we 
are hearing today, and to his right is Assemblyman Gerald Felando 
representing the San Pedro area, Torrance, Harbor area and also a 
long-standing member of the As Health 
like to welcome you all to this hearing. The hearing will focus 
on two groups of mentally disordered persons: dangerous mentally 
disordered offenders who may be prematurely released from detention, 
and dangerous mentally disordered individuals who have not committed 
crimes, but who pose a threat to others. Everyone who reads the 
newspapers knows that a problem exists. However, solu·tions are 
extremely elusive because of the difficulty in narrowly defining 
the population so that we do not incarcerate innocent and harmless 
people in our attempt to protect society from the truly dangerous. 
We have invited 13 participants who will comprise our round table. 
They represent prosecutors, defenders, government, civil rights 
organizations, and mental health professionals. They have been 
asked to respond to questions dealing with the magnitude of the 
problem, possible solutions, including expanded use of the civil 
commitment law as presented in AB 2727 by Assemblyman Dave Stirling. 
I have adapted a new approach which we've used quite regularly for 
the last few hearings, for this interim study. It's been our 
experience that when we have witnesses testifying before us, all 
we hear are 10 to 15 minute dissertations, rather than fruitful 
discussions and dialogue and interactions between the witnesses 
and the members of the Legislature. I think it's important, and 
we havE~ found out in the past, that by providing this new approach, 
we have been able to come up with substantive ideas and solutions, 
whereas before we've had to do it on our own. This way, by working 
together, perhaps we can come to some joint consensus. If not, the 
experience will have been well worth it. I've asked the consultant, 
Joan Amundson to summarize the issues for the Committee and for the 
witnesses, and I would like to limit our discussions to those issues 
unless the members or members of the witness panel deem fit to expano 
beyond that. Joan. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Chairman, may I just at this 
point thank Joan Amundson for the job that she has done in preparing 
the material and setting up this hearing, it's been outstanding 
work. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I agree. 
JOAN AMUNDSON: Thank you very much. I thought that in 
trying to focus on the particular piece of the Lanterman-Petris-
' Short Act that AB 2727 dealt with, it would be useful to have some 
chart lists, what I believe to be, the five essential questions 
before the Committee. We're dealing only with one of the groups 
that can be detained under the Civil Codes. The three groups are: 
gravely disabled, dangerous to self, and dangerous to others. We're 
dealing only with "dangerous to others". I do want to point out 
that before the process which we call the post-certification process 
begins, people have already been detained for 17 days. This will 
become significant when the witn(~sses start talking about some of 
the procedures. So, we're essenlially beginning at the end of the 
17th day when we go into the extended detention period for dangerous 
persons. The first chart asks the questions. The second chart 
answers them in accordance with current law, and the third chart 
answers them in accordance with AB 2727. I don't think I need to 
go over them other than to point out one piece that sometimes gets 
missed when people are reading AB 2727, and it's in the circ.:tmstances 
area where the "threats" has been added to attempt or actual in-
led to detention originally. Other 
than that, the bill extended the 90 days to one year; it did add 
out-patient treatment which i_s currently not in our 90 day P'JSt-
certification. The last question has to do with amenability, which 
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is not addressed in either current law or AB 2727, but we'll have 
testimony that will show that amenability and effectiveness of 
treatment may become the most important issues .n the future. Thank 
you very much. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, let's ask Hr. Stirling, who 
is the author of AB 2727, to briefly state the problems from his 
perspective. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will 
be very brief. I have submitted, at least to the members of the 
Committee, a composite of newspaper articles which is often referred 
to as a parade of horrors, but I didn't bring any victims in today, 
just these articles to at least point out some of the difficulties 
that the innocent, law-abiding citizens are expc~riencing from people 
who either have mental disorders and who should be under some type 
of mental care treatment, as well as those who get out of Corrections, 
Atascadero or Napa, but who still pose a danger to others. So that 
I feel presents what the problem is. There are many ways of going 
about this, perhaps. AB 2727 is an idea. It will no doubt change. 
In fact, this morning there have been some suggestions that I think 
have great merit, and so I'm sure that AB 2727 will not look like 
it does at this point when it's re-introduced in January. But now 
I would like to introduce Dorothy Jones, who is representing the 
County Counsels Association of California, to outline the problem 
that the attorneys responsible for t<1king steps in these particular 
cases go Lluoagh. I see Lire pioblem myself as not surely, and 
perhaps not even to the most part, a meni~al health problem; but 
the legal hurdles, dealing with the proc1·dures, basically is what 
AB 2727 attempts to address, the practic.rlity u 1cler the presc;nt 
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law of bringing these cases, and the difficulty that counsel has 
with these cases. I would like to introduce Dorothy Jones to go 
further in this particular area. 
DOROTHY JONES: Thank you. I'm Dorothy Jones, and I'm 
a Deputy County Counsel with the County of Marin, and also Chair-
person of the Section Probate in the Mental Health Section for the 
County Counsels Association of Marin. I'm not representing either 
of those entities here, but I've been asked by Assemblyman Stirling 
to assist, if I could, in letting you know some of the problems that 
attorneys, who have been designoted by their Boards of Supervisors 
to assist in the presentation of these cases, confront. I }now 
that in some counties the District Attorney handles the 5300 cases. 
In Marin, the County Counsel has been designated. The bill, as I 
see AB 2727, does address some of the problems that we see, and one 
of them is first in the filing of the petition. 5300 time guide-
lines are quite stringent and very often in some counties there may 
be a petition filed with the C](·rk and nobody knows what do do with 
it. Unless the attorneys in the various designated offices have b(~en 
advised, that petition may sit there in the Clerk's office, having 
been filed by the evaluating facility, without someone knowing how to 
shepherd it through the process, getting it filed, getting it set 
for hearing, getting an attorney appointed to represent the patient. 
So, I think the Legislature should provide that at least counsel, 
county counsel or the District Attorney, is brought into the pcoce:;s 
as soon as pos to assist in the preparation of the petition; 
have a review on whether or not the affadavits are adequate and 
factual allegations that are presented to the Court are as complete 
as possible. Without that assistance, by the time the matter gets 
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brought before the court, the time guidelines may have been mis:>ed 
and the petition would have to be refiled. And given the current 
definition, if you have to file a new , you've lost the 
right to hold that person in custody, because you no longer meet 
the factual guidelines. In the current definition, if you don't 
meet it exactly, you have lost the right to petition under that 
section. You do not have the right to threaten right now. If there 
is merely a threat, no matter how serious, you nhly have had the 
kind of acti n(J out of an individual. W(' hod a pntient l.n Marin 
C·mnty, vvho threatened to kill an adversary of his, went so far 
as to re~ch the person's house and automobile, threw rocks into the 
automobile and did other destruction, but did not get an opportunity, 
if you w 11, to attempt to inflict serious harm on that individual. 
He did ~Jt meet the Section 5300 guidel , could not, under those 
facts, r<:ceive treatment, although t.he doctors who had been treating 
him for ;orne time were deeply concerned that the individual neec.led 
treatment::. You do have a definitional problem that you've got the 
right, after someone has been brought into custody, to bring a 
petition on him for serious threat. But you don't have that if 
they'ue on the street, and have not been brought into custody. You 
have a reluctance by treating personnel to bring 90 day petitions 
and label someone dangerous. You have, in my experience some of 
the experiences of County Counsels, a reluctance by treating personnel 
to bring petitions under 530n. They are quite concerned that 90 days 
is not enough treatment, that it will only, at best, scratch tlre 
surface of treatment needs. It was told me on occasion, as well as 
other attorneys who work in this area, that they are really afraid 
of retaliation, that, and I'm sure Mr. Stirling can so advise you, 
happens in counties with people who have been dangerous, have been 
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prematurely released and gone after the treating personnel, so 
there is this reluctance. If there are any other facts that might 
more favorably fall under the grave disability statutes, those 
petitions will be brought under not 5300, but under 5350, and 
very often we have brought petitions under 5350 and have gotten 
minimum treatment, and it's only after we've had the facts i_o go 
under 5350 that the person has had an opportunity to get more than 
superficial treatment. Now, I know in terms of proving cases under 
the definition, very often the law provides for an immediatE: trial. 
The law currently provides that if you have the trial within 10 
days after your initial hearing, and maybe perhaps another 
continuance, you will find, thowrh, that the courts, on the request 
of the counsel for the patien~ who advises the court that he needs 
more time to adequately represent these clients in spite of the 
prohibitions currently within the law, that trials will not come 
before the courts and the juries sometimes for 17 to 30 additional 
days, and maybe longer. Part of that is because you have the 
backlog of civil cases in the various courts, and part of that 
is also strategy. Whereas, if the person gets another 15 or 30 
days, by the time they come to court, the treatment and medication 
they have received have, at least for the moment, reduced the overt 
symptoms of mental disorder. With medications, sometimes as little 
as 30 days medication, you no longer have the symptoms of mental 
disorder; the delusions, the hallucinations, that really make it 
abundantly 
suffering from a mental illness. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Are you suggesting to this Committee 
that some judges are releasing drugged up patients in order to 
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release them from the institution because they no longer show the 
symptoms of mental disorders? 
MS. JONES: I'm not saying the judges necessarily will do 
that, but juries will, when you have a burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and a unanimous verdict; when you have that kind 
of burden of proof, and you have a patient who is not drugged up, 
who because of the medication and treatment received, no longer 
exhibits demonstrable symptoms of mental illness. The short term 
treatment can, in a sense, calm; there are no longer flights of 
thought, there's no longer really apparent hallucinations, that 
when the jury has to decide, "does that person present, at this 
time an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to someone 
else?" that's really a question of doubt. Do they, at this 
time, present that threat? When the patient comes up in court 
and advises the jury, "I never should have done that, I know I 
need help and I'm never going to do that again, I'm always going 
to take my medication," there is a reasonable doubt whether at 
that time the person presents the requirements of the law and yes, 
patients are released. There is a very heavy burden of proof that 
that person not only, presented, at the time the petition was filed, 
the requirements of the statute, but do they continue after a 
period of 30 days treatment 1 to present that same risk of harm to the 
community. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EGELAND: I wanted to ask Joan a question. 
We discussed this in a different context in terms of gravely 
disabled and the fact that in the past the same problem exi:3ted 
when a person was labeled gravely disabled. After they had been 
in custody for several days, and had had a good bed to slee::> in and 
good food and been washed up, they no longer looked gravely disabled. 
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J\m I correct that there was ;;ome change in the law in terms of being 
,tble to consider th.e pattern of behavior when dealing with the term 
qravely disabled? The second part of the question is, was that 
change in law extended to anything other than gravely disabled? 
MS. AMUNDSON: Yes, the amendment which I think was two 
"ears ago, permitted the investigator's report to be submitted in 
<!Vidence, which had not been possible before, and I'm told that it 
c~oes allow history to be discussed during the procedure. That does 
I.ot extend to the 90 day, as I understand it. It also brings up 
c:nother problem that I don't think you've referred to yet, Miss 
.=ones, and that is the fact that the treating physician need not be 
present to testify. That also, then, precludes history and what the 
person might have been like, from being a part of that jury trial, 
and that's one of the problems that I've heard around the State. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EGELAND: Well then, on that point, would 
you consider a change in the law for the 90 day procedure along the 
lines that Joan just discussed, to be a help? 
MS. JONES: Well, I know in our county the treating 
physician, or, if you will, the evaluating physician; is unable 
to appear, then I have never seen a defense attorney in our county 
or very many that I know of, that will permit the petition to go 
forward on the evaluating papers, the affidavits. Generally, the 
treating physician or the evaluating physician is not available, so 
that if the County Counsel or the D.A. wishes to 
or she will ask for a court ordered evaluation so that at the very 
minimum have someone come in who could testify as to the current 
mental disorder. Now, when you say the treating physician need not 
be present, you do need a psychiatrist to present testimony. 
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r.f you've got an uncontested matter, you're not going to have a jur):' 
trial, you're going to go before a court and have the election of a 
court hearing, then you'll have the matter submitted to the court 
on the affidavits. But if you're going to have a contested trial, 
there is going to have to be some psychiatrist present to present 
the testimony regarding the evaluation. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN EGELAND: What about the other part? In 
other words, if there's a contested trial, would not a change be 
good so that in this procedure you would be able to look at the 
repetition of behavior, the repetition of the threats? We could 
change the definitions as we did with gravely disabled to allow that 
to be submitted as evidence. 
MS. JONES: You have under the conservatorship, a procedure 
that allows the court to consider the past behavior as evidence, 
and that is the conservatorship investigator's report. You have 
under the conservatorship system, the referrals going to a 
conservatorship investigator. You have a 30 day period upon which 
you have an individual who's been designated by the Legislature, 
to investigate the alternatives to conservatorship as well as the 
pattern, past background, and that is admitted. Under 5300, past 
behavior is known to the evaluating psychiatrist,either court 
appointed or treating. He can base his opinion on those facts, 
but if they're not known and very often given the short timeframe, 
the court or the jury may not have all the background information 
on that J.ndl.Vldual. 'I'he investigator has access to wide information 
such as police records and treating history at other facilities. 
Under 530Q you don't have that immediate access to that information 
to always present it to the evaluating or currently treating 
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physician. So, I don't know whether you want to set up another level 
of review, but perhaps the court and the current conservatorship 
investigator might have the ability to do some brief report. I know 
there has been suggestion that the 5350 section, which is the 
conservatorship section, might be amended to provide for the treatment 
under the conservatorship program of those who may fall under the 
imminently dangerous section. There are currently in some counties, 
imminenely dangerous individuals who might qualify for that, are 
under conservatorship because in addition to the imminently dangerous 
symptoms they may have, they are also gravely disabled or could 
qualify. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Excuse me, Mr. Guthman what's the 
experience in Los Angeles County? 
MR. DAVID GUTHMAN: David Guthman, Los Angeles County 
District Attorney's Office. The 90 day post-certification procedures 
are comparatively unused in Los Angeles County. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Why is that? 
MR. GUTHMAN: Let me give you the numbers, and I'll tell 
you my beliefs. So far in this calendar year, we've had one case, 
in calendar year 1979 we had two caes, in calendar year 1978 we had 
three cases. There are several reasons why the statutes are not 
used. One reason is that if the initial behavior of the individual, 
which brings them into some system of state control is dangerous 
enough, they go to jail rather than to a hospital, and the person 
~~~~MlJ~l~Ji~thruuglL~tne~~~imina+jus tice pyst:errc~~ ~K~~~second urea~soniS~~ ~~~ ~ 
that for multiple reasons including the length of hospitalization 
and the perceived difficulty of proof in such cases, there is a 
tendency on the part of the treatment personnel in the LPS system 
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to seek a conservatorship which would give a year with a patient 
on a more benign. standard of grave disability than to seek a 90 
day shorter commitment; 90 days on a less benign standard of a 
judicial labeling of mentally disordered or dangerous. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is that practice justified do you 
think? 
MR. GUTHMAN: I don't know. One of the problems I have 
in coming to the this hearing today is I think I can identify a 
lot of the problems, but I've had difficulty coming up with some 
of the answers. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Felando. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: What are we doing here, maybe I 
don't understand this. Are we plea bargaining now in the mental 
health system? 
MR. GUTHMAN: The 90 day commitment statute is, in essence, 
unused in Los Angeles County. I think one of the reasons it is 
unused is, because at the point in the treatment process in the LPS 
detention process when a decision is to be made as to seeking a 
90 day commitment for dangerousness or a one-year conservatorship 
for grave disability, an election is made by the treatment personnel 
to seek the conservatorship. That doesn't corr .. e to the county 
counsel or the District Attorney, that is a decision that is made 
at the hospital level before any action or contact is made with the 
office of the county counsel or the District Attorney who would 
prosecute it. There have in too past, althou~h with the number of 
cases we've had it hasn't occurred in quite some time, we have in 
the past had cases that were filed under the 90 day dangerousness 
commitment statute where at the suggestion of the patient's attorney 
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the case was settled or plea bargained out a one year 
I that was because 
a feel that the j 
much more acceptable than the j 
and mental ill. I hope that your 
of dangerous 
I do believe 
ss Jones that one of elements of AB 727 that she 
is that instead of the done treatment 
l go through either the county counsel or di 
's office and as Mr. Stirling knows, that's a that 
has been done in Los Angeles County by court rule for about four 
years. Not only has that ished or, essence, el 
(although the number of cases we have is so small you 
valid the concl are) , the 
on non-compliance with the 
of cases thrown out 
the tatute. But, 
it has 
who is 
so provided a mechanism for pre-fil 
to have to prove the case in court, and 
we have , at least Los 
the 
that a significant of cases we are contacted 
troat.mcnt personnel wit:h a request_ to file 9 
commitment tion very clear that that would not have 
appropriate; that conservatorship would been one f 
treatment may have been one of the al 
or no invo treatment may have one of al 





as many cases that are not filed, where 
the request comes to my office and one the , who is 
hopeful very well skilled in these areas, it and makes a 
determination that it: would not be an matter to file. 
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the county counsel or strict or So, I 
the use the term to filing is very 
There' one other poin s Jones alluded that 
I the slature at some 
and that deals with issue of 
to normalcy, and the impact in these 
to to address, 
l re 
There s a 
criminal case that is now pend before the second distric Court 
of that s the "not reason of " issue 
that is one of sues has been court. 
Whether or not a person who is mental ill is 
tled to be released because on all of the 
mental illness are gone. 
ASSEMBLYMAN TORRES: What's name of that case? 
MR. GUTHMl-iN: Well, I can tell 's e versus. 
That is a very sting issue in all of the LPS s and 
I think in all types of actions where 
based on an IS mental i lness. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES That point been I'd 1 
to some the Publ now, Mr. May 
I ask you 11r. Guthman and ss Jones to very is it 
more the practice of priva counsel to pursue Lha or is 
the practice pursued across the board 
? 
MR. GUTfLl\1AN: I can't any Los 
court to someone a 0 day pos fication 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is that true in Marin County as well? 
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MS. JONES: No, we've had private attorneys when our 
public defender is already representing them in a criminal matter 
that they may have also pending and have asked the court to relieve 
them on the basis that they don't feel that they can adequately 
represent them on the 5300. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So a civil counsel is used for that? 
MS. JONES: Right, it's used for that and I find i:he 
practice is uniform, that requests for continuances are usual if 
it's going to be contested. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So, an analogy would be then, a person 
who is picked up on a 502 obviously cannot walk the line when he's 
picked up, yet in a courtroom when that person has been sobt~red, that 
person obviously allegedly could walk the line. What we're saying 
here is that as a result of these situations we're talking about 
people who may not exhibit mental disorders if they're under 
pharmacological influences. Is that a fair way to approach the 
implementation of justice in our system? 
MR. DAVID MEYER: Mr. Chairman, I'm afrai.d I'd have to say 
it's not a fair characterization of what goes on in real life. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, you tell us what is a fair 
characterization, Mr. Meyer. 
DAVID MEYER: David Meyer, Mr. Chairman, California 
Public Defenders Association. The fact is that mental illness 
treatment by neuroleptics and other major drugs does not break 
itself down into 
notmentally ill, symptomatology, absence of symptomatology, 
remiss·ion versus illness. It is a series of greys, if you will, 
that lie somewhere between those extremes. Very rarely do you see 
someone who is fluoridly mentally ill at the time they are brought 
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into the. facility, and then when they are presented to a court or 
for that matter, to anyone else, are totally remitted. In other 
words, there is no symtomatology whatsoever. There are shades and 
permutations of that phenomenon, I agree. However, let me say that 
when you discuss mental illness as such or mental disorder, you 
must approach it with the understanding that it exists only in terms 
of observable phenomenon. It never exists in a test tube. One may 
not blow into an ampule and determine a blood level of mental illness. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Meyer, I'm sure we're not naive 
to· presume that we're conducting test tube experiments in the 
courtroom, and we are aware that those shades of grey are present 
and a jury must decide on a case by case method. What we are 
concerned about and I can feel the heat of the other members, is, is 
it appropriate to put a person into that courtroom and allow the jury 
to see someone who is under the influence of drugs in that courtroom 
to make a realistic appraisal of that person on a case by case method? 
MR. MEYER: Of course it is, Mr. Chairman, and I can 
suggest that there would be no other way of doing it since the 
hypothesis that's been posited by Miss Jones and Mr. Guthman suggests 
that the individual would be medicated at the time they are brought 
in, and in the absence of medication, would be psychotic. That is 
not always true, of course, it does not follow one from the other. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Then, if it does not follow one from 
another, shouldn't we take the risk to allow that observation to be 
made by the jury on a case by case method? 
MR. MEYER: Again, we must distinguish a number of things. 
First of all, Mr. Stirling has described two different groups that 
must be distinguish~d one from another. One is a group of people 
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who are in prison, who are dang·~rous when they get out. 
CHAIRMAN 'l'ORRES: I don't want to distinguish anything 
Mr. Meyer, I'm merely positing to you and perhaps in a vacuum. 
Should anyone be under the influence of drugs while they're under-
going a trial to make a determination of whether or not they are 
capable to be out in the street? 
MR. MEYER: They're medicated, Mr. Chairman, not under 
the influence of drugs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: After the 3 days, then you've got 
the 14 day period, and during those periodsof time, there is medi-
cation that is administered so that when the individual comes to 
court, you've had 17 days of medication as counsel pointed out. 
MR. MEYER: There's no other real treatment for mental 
illness, Mr. Chairman. If you want to treat people, and that's the 
reason you have them in the hospital and not in prison, you must 
give them medication. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Yes, but clearly treating them, and then 
releasing them are two different things. Mr. Felarido. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: They are truly under the influence 
of drugs, without a doubt, and if you're going to allow that, then 
I would assume that you would also allow a person to come into the 
courtroom under the influence of PCP. 
MR. MEYER: No, of course not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: Why not? 
you re 
the use of an illegal substance, which we all would prefer not to 
see in any form, courtroom or otherwise, and a form of treatment. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: But both people are under the influe1.ce 
of drugs. 
MR. MEYER: No, I must disc::tgree with you. They are nc>t 
under the influence of drugs. No more than a person who takes 
insulin for diabetes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: You have a position in that you're 
sitting out there and you're deciding which way it's going to go 
to suit your particular ideas. 
MR. MEYER: I disagree with you, of course. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Guthman, a reaction, brief. 
MR. GUTHMAN: First, I believe the California Supreme Court 
has already commented on this issue of taking the patient off 
medication so he can be viewed in his normal or true state, and it's 
what we lawyers refer to as dicta. But in a case called In re 
Gonzales in Six Cal third, the court frowned upon the desire to have 
the person taken off medication, so his craziness would show for the 
court process. Secondly, I do believe that there is a valid concept 
in the treatment of mental illness in the institutionalized treatment 
of the mentally ill, known as drug holidays, and that is something 
that perhaps can be considered as part of the treatment once an 
individual is in the system. And, lastly, if what we're concerned 
with is an opportunity to see if someone who is mentally ill and 
dangerous is not dangerous when on medication, but maybe dangerous 
off medication, not only is the drug holiday concept one way of 
viewing it, although that's within the institu·tional confines, but 
the out-patient provisions are also mechanisms whereby there could 
be hopefully, appropriate control during these observation periods 
to make that determination. As a prosecutor who does these cases, 
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I am not that concerned with the person's mental illness being .n 
remission due to medication, so long as I have the ability to bring 
out prior history of the persons medicating or not medicating, and 
to have some pharmaceutical testimony as to the effects of the 
medication. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You're allowed to do that now? 
MR. GUTHMAN: I believe so, except I'll tell you what 
the problem is under these statutes. A 90 day petition is filed, 
and if you read the statutes, it goes to trial four days after it's 
filed unless the patient asks for the matter to be continued. In 
most instances, the historical background and search for information 
that Ms. Jones referred to, or that is used in the conservatorship 
investigation, is just absolutely impossible to have for purposes 
of presenting in a courtroom, within the four day period provided by 
statute within which that case must go to trial, or perhaps within 
the 14 day period in the event the patient or defendant then asks 
for the matter to be continued. But certainly past history of the 
individual, including medication history, is relevant. The problem 
comes up when all of that is put before a trier of fact and the 
issue is "imminent threat of substantial harm", and that's a problem 
that obviously is addressed in part by this legislation, and you 
must consider it because the standard is such that no matter how bad 
the past history may be, the issue of imminence and of substantial 
harm raises a problem. I call to your attention that in legislation 
enacted 
disordered sex offender, and the persons acquitted by reason of 
insanity for purposes of extending commitment, the Legislature used 
a different standard than is in this bill, and the standard there is 
"substantial danger of harm", rather than "demonstrated danger of 
-19-
substantial harm". The word substantial in existing NGI and MDSO 
extension laws. modifies a different word than in this proposed statute, 
and I think there should be some consistency unless the Legislature 
is deliberately trying to make a very very higher standard. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: The problem with this, members, and I 
think i '' you review your background, is the almost incapacity for 
us to predict dangerous. 
MR. GUTHMAN: That's a red herring, that a specious red 
herring. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: The studies that we have been able to 
determine, indicate to us that the research data provides no greater 
basis for optimism, including the 1976 study in New York in which 
only 14% of a group believed to be dangerous were rearrested for 
violent offenses compared with 16% of the non-dangerous groups. 
Furthermore, there is a likelihood that false positives will be 
detained while the·false negatives victimize the community. Now, 
Dr. Thompson, what do you think about all that, representing the 
Califor~ia Psychiatric Association? 
DR. CAPTANE THOMPSON: Thank you, I'm Captane Thompson, 
I'm her.~ representing the California Psychiatric Association. We 
psychiacrists do not like to be put into a position in whichwe have 
no good scientific basis from which to operab~. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: But when you are, are you in concurrence 
with Mr. Guthman who obviously is not in concurrence with that issue? 
DR. THOMPSON: With any degree of accuracy, yes. We may 
have some better, some greater ability to predict immediate danger-
ousness in an acutely disturbed, thrashing, violent person, ~nd say 
within the next couple of hours this person who four policeman had 
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to bring in, may cause some harm to someone if he's not subdued. 
Yes, that 1nan i.s probably dangerous at this particular moment. But 
to say that somebody who is in a hospital, who's been treated for a 
period of time, or who's been in prison for a number of years is 
now, if released, going to cause great damage, we may feel quite 
convinced that we're right, but the evidence just doesn't support it. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: How many of those cases would you suggest 
' are people who are under the influence of drugs, or rather under 
medication? 
DR. THOMPSON: Well, most people who are in hospitals for 
treatment of serious psychosis are going to be under the treatment 
of neuroleptic drugs. Their psychosis will be under control as long 
as they're treated with the drugs. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: As long as they are treated with the drugs, 
what assurances do we, as the public, have of those that that 
treatment is going to occur if that person is released as a result 
of a recommendation by a psychiatrist or psychologist? 
DR. THOMPSON: If the person is undergoing involuntary 
care that suggests that he is not willing to accept treatment volun-
tarily, and if so, we would expect that if he's released he'll stop 
taking the drugs, and therefore, revert to whatever state he was in 
before, within a period of time. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I'd like to introduce the other members 
who have walked in, Assemblyman Pat Nolan who is a member of the 
Oakland area who is a member of the Criminal Justice Committee. 
This is a joint hearing of the Criminal Justice and Health Committees. 
We also have Dan Chandler with the Assembly Office of Research, 
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Michael Ullman, who is :tlh.e principal consultant to the Committee 
on Criminal Justice and Mary Shaw who h> Legislative Counsel with 
the Legislature in Sacramento. Mr. Nolim for a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Dave, I was interested in your comment 
that it was a red herring. Are we looking for the wrong thing in 
trying to predict future carnage, is that your point? In other. 
words, are we setting up a standard that the psychiatrists cannot 
by their own discipline, address, and if so, is there an alternative 
standard that we could be using, with the underlying thought of 
protecting society from future harm, while protecting the individual 
who is no longer going to be of harm? 
MR. GUTHMAN: I'm familiar with the studies Mr. Torres 
referred to, they document rather clearly the inability to predict 
reliably and validly future dangerous behavior. My belief is that 
in cases such as this, the issue that is presented to the judge or 
jury is not a prediction of whether the person will commit a future 
dangerous act, but whether or not the person can be identified as 
one who is likely to commit a future dangerous act. The question 
we must ask is, is Three-mile Island dangerous only when there is a 
melt-down, or is it dangerous all of the time? Or the boulder that 
hung over the highway in Malibu for five or six hundred years, until, 
all of a sudden, it started falling down? Do you wait until it 
actually falls down to say it's dangerous, or do you look at it and 
say it's dangerous while it's hanging over the highway? I believe 
that is the difference. It's not predict~ng future dangerousness, 
dangerous behavior, it's identifying those individuals who are 
more likely than not to be dangerous or to commit dangerous acts 
in the future, and that's why I characterize the prediction issue 
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as a specious red herring. 
CHAIEMAN TORRES: So, in that line Mr. Guthman, you 
argue again that as a result of drug medication that prevents you 
or that prevents a jury from making an honest determination on that 
incidence of violence and not the predictabilityof that violence? 
MR. GUTHMAN: To a certain extent, yes, but I think that 
with adequate preparation for trial the prosecutor should be able 
to put together enough information to present to the judgE' or jury 
to show the person's past track record, and from that alle>w the 
judge or jury to make a determination as to the future. 'J'he 
difference between these proceedings and purely criminal proceedings 
is that in a criminal proceeding, the issue presented to the trier 
of fact is the determination of a fact that occurred in t:he past. 
In these issues, what we're talking about is something that may 
occur in the future or what the person's mental state may be in the 
future, and that is significantly different that proof of past 
behavior. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright Mr. Nolan for another question 
and then Mr. Stirling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Dr. Thomp§lon, the psychiatrists that 
I've talked to have very definite opinions about the patients that 
they treat, and are very definite in saying that some people should 
be held and others shouldn't. What question could be asked of you 
in a courtroom which elici~that response? When I say to these 
person an imminent danger?" they say, 
"there's no way I can say that, I have no basis on which to say 
that", but they have very definite opinions based on their 
professional training about whether this person should be held. So 
what question properly put to a psychiatrist would elicit responses 
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about whether they need to be held for treatment or should be 
released? 
DR. TKOMPSON: If you asked me about a prognosis of the 
patient's illness, that is, is this person apt to do well and never 
again be mentally ill, or is he very apt to again have another 
breakdown, I can say, based on his number of previous episodes, 
his response to treatment, his willingness to accept treatment, 
our ability to follow up and make sure that he gets his medication, 
and so forth, whether he's apt to become ill again. On that I 
feel fairly confident that I could give you a reasonably accurate 
prediction of what behavior we'll see. If he is violent, is 
repeatedly associated with episodes of decompensation, then we might 
have a good reason to say that this person is apt to become violent 
again. However, the unfortunate thing is that because we always 
want to err on the side of caution, we are much more apt to predict 
people will be violent than not in borderline cases, and we're much 
more apt then to have people preventively detained on the basis of 
our opinions who, if freed, would not do something dangerous. Thece 
have been a number of studies now showing that we over-predict in 
something like 80% to 90% of the cases. That means that we would be 
detaining a large number of people in the hope that we catch a few, 
and we'd be missing some quite dangerous people who don't look 
dangerous when we talk to them. So, the interview by itself, is a 
notoriously unreliable predictor of future behavior. What we need 
is a past history of previous episodes, and actuarial basis, some 
way to say that there is a demonstrated danger present in this 
person. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Do you feel comfortable with the 
standard as used in AB 2727, "demonstrated danger of substantial 
harm" as being likely to weed out those cases where you err on the 
side of caution? 
DR. THOMPSON: Yes, that suggestion came from Dr. Bernard 
Diamond, Professor of Law and Psychiatry at the Bolt School of Law 
who's just retired, and the point, the effort there is to try to 
avoid prediction of future violence and to say does this person 
have a pattern of behavior, as Ms. Egeland has mentioned, that gives 
us some reason to be cautious and fearful about that particular 
person? I think that's a sounder approach than asking people to 
be cretious and look into a crystal ball and say this one is, this 
one isn't. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING. I wanted to point that out that we 
have attempted to avoid the problem that Dr. Thompson has addressed 
here. While I don't particularly agree with his basic premise, 
because I think predictability of criminality does occur and when 
you talk about "not guilty by reason of insanity", and "incompetent 
to stand trial", I believe that psychiatrists can address that 
problem there, they for some reason can't in these cases. However, 
because Dr. Diamond made the suggestion, and it appeared to be well 
taken, we have tried to change the present standard from imminent 
threat of substanial harm to demonstrated danger of substantial 
harm. I would point out just for the committee's 
morning Joan Amundson did submit some language, which I thought was 
interesting, and I would like to just throw it out for further 
consideration. 
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CHAIRMAN TORRES: I wanted to hit on another issue that is 
close to the heart of Mr. Felando. We had this discussion when your 
bill was up before the subcommittee and that is an issue that you 
raised earlier. I'd like to have Byron Chell, from the Department 
of Mental Health respond. The Jamison V. Farabee case where the 
issue apparently, and I don't know whether it's been resolved or 
not, rna~ well result in the right on the part of the involuntarily 
detained mentally disordered persons to refuse psychoactive medications 
and othectreatments. Where is that case and could you give us some 
kind of prediction, if it's not been determined, where you think it 
will lead? 
MR. BYRON CHELL: The Jamison versus Farabee case is on 
file in the Federal District Court in San Francisco. It does deal 
with the right of involuntarily detained civil patients to refuse 
medications. The case has really gone nowhere since it was filed 
in 1978 in regard to the cause of action relating to involuntary 
patients. It's still sitting down there. There are, however, a 
number of cases ·back east dealing with the same subject matter; one 
out of Massachusetts, one out of New Jersey, which have already had 
a decision in the trial court level, and upheld the iight of 
involuntarily detained patients to refuse treatment. They've both 
been argued in the Circuit Courts of Appeal back there, and we're 
awaiting a decision right now. A point I'd like to make in regard 
to those cases is that those cases are not, in my opinion, about 
substantive rights, that is, if those cases are upheld, we are not 
going to have a situation which doctors cannot involuntarily treat 
mental patients, hut those cases are about procedures. That is, 
what procedures does the state have to comply with, to follow, before 
an involuntarily committed patient can refuse treatment particulary 
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anti-psychotic medications, and these cases are about anti-psychotic 
medi.cations.. The gist of that is that the courts may very well end 
up saying, before you can involuntarily treat a mental heaJth patient 
with anti-psychotic medications you must have a specific fjnding of 
incompetence. We don't do that in California right now. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Beermann. Do you agree with the 
fact that we ought to have a statute dealing with incompetency that 
we don't have now? 
LOUIS BEERMANN: Yes, sir, I do. I think that some changes 
should be made in that. It wasn't part of our position paper, but 
we .have looked at it, and I really haven't made up my mind yet 
looking at tha.t whole area. As Byron said, we may have some legis-
lation, but we haven't gotten that far yet with our thinking but it 
may be a fertile area. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Is there any other comment on that 
particular issue from any of the witnesses? 
DR. SCHOCK: I think the concept of competence was 
purposely not introduced originally because if they have to be 
competent to volunteer you cannot have as many voluntary patients. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Schock would you agree with Dr. 
Thompson on the predictability of violence in that problem? 
DR. SCHOCK: I kind of agree with what Dave Guthman said, 
that it's often used as a red herring. It's very difficult to say 
such and such a person is going to commit a crime. I do feel 
however 
crimes before, and you have been treating them, you have a fdir 
batting average. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Mavritte, do you agree with that? 
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DR. HAROLD MAVRITTE: That's almost as saying when did you 
stop heating- your wife, but I think one of the basic things that we 
are missing here is that we're trying to, or are equating mental 
disorder with dangerousness. The two are not necessarily equatable. 
If you want to deal with dangerousness, I think it is the state's 
responsibility to defend society, and naturally, to isolate 
dangerous individuals from society is carrying out that defensive 
function, but to equate that with mental disorder and dangerousness 
is really a red herring. .If you look at statistics it will show 
you that the most dangerous persons as far as assaults, crime and 
criminal behavior are concerned are adults. These are males below 
the ages of 25, which has nothing to do with mEntally disordered 
males below the age of 25, so I think that's one important issue 
that we should deal with, and some of the other things I think we'll 
get to as we're going along. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: Doctor, you made a statement about 
males under the age of 25 and violence. Am I to assume by the 
statement that you made that a certain amount of violence in everybody 
is acceptable and not considered mentally ill? 
DR. MAVRITTE: If you want my personal opinion, I would 
say yes, not an acceptable level of violence but equating violence 
with mental illness. Those two things are not i::he same. I'm sure 
that many individuals can become angry, do acts that are socially 
unacceptable, but it does not necessarily mean that they are mentally 
ill according to the standard that we go by now as far as those 
diagnostic categories and DSM 2, 3, 1 or anything else. They don't 
have any overt psychosis, they just have different social and 
cultural standards of behavior th,m we have. Many of them are 
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criminals. They might be inherently evil. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: I'm not talking about becoming 
an~ry, I'm talking about violence, let's say physical violence. 
Is a certain amount of physical violence normal? Does the normal 
in:Hvidual possess this? 
DR. MAVRITTE: I would say yes, those potentialities are 
always there, and that does not necessarily mean that someone is 
mentally ill. We have laws and people go out there and kill each 
other, and I don't think they're mentally ill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: But don't they reflect some level 
of mental imbalance? 
DR. MAVRITTE: No, I would not think so. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Yockey, where are we going to put 
all these people if AB 2727 is passed? 
MR. SAM YOCKEY: Sam Yockey, Chief Deputy, Department of 
Cocrections. If the intent is to label them as mentally ill, then 
most assuredly your legitimate obligation would be to place them 
in treatment rather than to incarcerate them. As a matter of fact, 
we are busy trying to talk the Department of Mental Health into 
providing acute psychiatric services to our mentally ill offenders 
pr 3sently housed in the Departmen ': of Corrections. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: And w:1at do they say? 
MR. YOCKEY: We're exploring the issue and looking at the 
problem• They are so over-crowded right now they have shut off 
services wusra:ndwe1 :re :r mnring~om:ofneascollecti vely in the 
system. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: When will we have a Director of Mental 
He1lth, do we know Mr. Chell and Mr. Beermann? 
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MR. CHELL: We have an interim director right now. Our 
understanding is it's for 30 days only, other than that we know 
nothing. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: So after a post-certification we'll 
have a new Director. Mr. Macomber, representing the Youth and Adult 
Correctional Agency, have you encountered the problem of management 
and where we place these individuals? 
MR. GARY MACOMBER: Yes we have. As Mr. Yockey points 
out, we're trying to get the Department of Mental Health to give 
us some assistance here. I think it's important to point out to 
the gentlemen here that of the dangerous offenders coming into the 
state prison, we've proposed and will continue to, as the consultant 
points out in her analysis, make attempted murder, for example, a 
life crime returning that to an indeterminancy so that we don't 
continue to reward someone who has poor aim. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What would your recommendation be in 
terms of passage of AB 2727 or a combination thereof.· 
MR. MACOMBER: Our agency is supportive of the extension 
to one year. We have some concerns with the "threaten" language 
because of the large population we have that engages in this type 
of threat. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: As a matter of course? 
MR. MACOMBER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Issue No. 5, and then I'd like to get 
1nto the proposal to toss out to the Committee and the panel of 
witnesses, the amenability to treatment issue. Cap would you respond 
to that, and then Dr. Schock. 
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DR. THOMPSON: The idea of locking people up who are not 
treatable under the assumption that they are mentally ill, I suspect 
would have difficulty constitutionally. I know that in the 
Compellebee decision the decision was made that mentally disturbed 
sex offenders could not be held longer than their sentence unless 
they are treatable. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Stirling for a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Cap, we've gotten into this issue 
before. Just a moment ago you said that medication was treatment. 
Now, wouldn't any patient be treatable by medication, and therefore 
amenable, even those that the doctors in Compellebee said we can't 
do any good for this individual any longer? There is not one iota 
of evidence that what we have been doing all this time has done him 
any good, but as long as they keep him on medication isn't he 
truly being treated, and therefore, isn't he amenable to continued 
treatment? You, yourself, said that treatment with medication was 
treatment. 
DR. THOMPSON: Medication is treatment for people whose 
condition responds to medication, but there are many people who 
have sociopathic or psychopathic personalities, for example, who 
might be quite dangerous, who would be diagnosable as fitting 
within some category of mental disorder, personality disorder, who 
are not treatable with our anti-psychotic medications. To hold 
people under the guise of treatment and force drugs into them when 
drugs are them, does not seem to me to be a humane 
or appropriate response to people. There are people, schizophrenics 
for example, who respond to neuroleptic drugs, manics who respond 
to lithium, seriously depressed people who respond to anti-depressant 
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drugs who we can't treat, and to keep them and hold them and 
treat them to prevent them decompensating and again, doing things 
which may be dangerous seems to me quite appropriate and 
responsible, but I don't think you can hold people, even though 
they may be very da~gerous, who are not suffering from a 
substantial mental disorder. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: We're all familiar with the case 
of Franks. He's be2n in so long and he's so wise to the system 
and to the questions that he plays games with the psychiatrist, 
and so I suppose one could conclude that he truly is no longer 
amenable to treatment, but he's still dangerous. What do we do 
with him? If the Compellebee decision were carried to its 
logical conclusion, what would the effect be on society for these 
people? 
DR. THOMPSON: Are you saying that a person would not be 
treatable if he simple refused to take the medicine? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Not just that, those that would 
not be treated by medicine, the other type, that are prison wise, 
or facility wise if you will. What do we do with them if they are 
still dangerous, but are not amenable to treatment? 
DR. THOMPSON: Your option, then, is to preventively 
detain those people because you believe they're dangerous, even 
though they are not treatably mentally ill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Where do we detain them? 
DR. THOMPSON: I suspect that could not 
tionally do that, and so, at best, all you can capture with the 
AB 2727 approach is that segment of that total population of 
dangerous people who are mentally ill and treatable. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And tre others who are mentally 
ill but not treatable, we have to let them back out into society, 
is that what you're suggesting? 
DR. THOMPSON: Those who havE major mental disorders, 
I am s~re that you can treat, or you cEn work with, but those who 
don't suffer from a "substantial" mental disorder, such as 
SchiZOfhrenia, manic depressive psychosis, depressive psychosis, 
I don't think that you would have grourds to hold under a mental 
commitrrent. You can hold them under a criminal commitment, if 
they commit a crime. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You mean after he goes after 
another victim? 
DR. THOMPSON: Yes, after there's a victim, or you 
could have a repeated habitual violent offender statute for 
people ~ho repeatedly injure other people, fine, but the majority 
of people who are dangerous are not mentally ill, so you are, at 
best, g=tting a small segment of the pie with a bill like that. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Felando, then Mr. Bates. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: I want to try and clear up that 
issue of treatability, are you saying in fact, that there are 
individuals that are not treatable? 
DR. THOMPSON: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: But, just the mere administration 
of a drug is a treatment. I know we're arguing fine points, but 
really there is nobody that is not treatable. Is that not so? 
I'm not saying treatable with an end result, I'm saying treatable. 
DR. THOMPSON: Treatable carries with it the expectation 
of improvement in one's condition. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN FEU\NDO: Yes, but not when you start 
talking with the attorneys. That's a whole different ballgame. 
DR. THOMPSON: Or at best maintenance of a person's 
condition so that he won't. deteriorate but to force drugs into 
somebody who does not havE a condition which is susceptible to 
our current treatment is rot an appropriate medical activity. I 
don't think it's an appror·riate legislative activity. I don't 
think that we have groundf to treat people who we cannot define 
as "treatable". 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELl.NDO: Then you would be amenable to 
the suggestion that we lock these people up forever. Is that 
right, or for the rest of their lives, that they are never ever 
turned loose on society if they're not treatable? I'm not trying 
to put words in your moutl·, I just asked for an opinion, you know. 
DR. THOMPSON: lm I amenable to ..... 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELI.NDO: To the idea of locking these 
untreatable psychopaths a~ay forever or for the rest of their 
lives? 
DR. THOMPSON: J don't think as a doctor it's up to me 
to say what to do with untreatable people. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: Would you turn them loose on 
society, Doctor? 
DR. THOMPSON: As a doctor, it's not my job to hold 
such people in a hospital. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: Well, that's what I'm asking, 
would you turn them loose on society? 
DR. THOMPSON: If they commit say three violent offenses, 
then if you wish to call them habitual violent offenders and 
throw the key away, I think that's a social decision which you 
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are in the position to make. I, as a physician, cannot make 
those social decisions. I can only treat those people who are 
medically treatable. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Miss Amundson, would you like to 
respond, then we'll go to Mr. Bates. 
MS. AMUNDSON: Yes, I thought it micJilt be useful to 
clarify the treatability groupings. Sam Yockey is now the Chief 
Deputy Director of Corrections, but we do need to point out that 
he has for the last 3~ years also been the Director of Atascadero 
State Hospital, which houses MDSO's. The comment that I think 
needs to be made for clarification here is that one of the most 
significant groups in the problem area that we're discussing 
are the mentally disordered sex offenders. That is the group 
that most of the mental health professionals that I've talked 
with would agree are not mentally ill, many of whom are not 
treatable. I think it would be useful if Mr. Yockey were to 
comment on the treatability of the MDSO population currently 
held at Atascadero. 
MR. YOCKEY: First of all, I am not a clinician. 
Secondly, Ted Franks was a graduate of Atascadero while I was 
there, so if we put everything in that framework, you'd also 
get some feeling of my skill level. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: You didn't give him a diploma did 
you? 
MR. YOCKEY: No, but anybody who left there while I was 
there was my problem, and I am still hearing about it. During 
the three and a half years I was with Atascadero, we found that 
of the approximately 200 MDSO's admitted each year, we found 
reason to reject half that amount every year, in other words, 
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50'5 and it was climbing. 'l'he Jaw, speaking then .md now, in my 
opinion, is far too broad. It should be tightened up substantially. 
CHAI~mN TORRES: What do mean tightened up 
substantially? 
MR. YOCKEY: I think right now the concept that a 
person is predisposed to the commission of a crime, suffers from 
a major defect, disorder, or disease, we've all got all of the 
above. I've got car thieves who qualify , they can't pass 
a car without stealing the thing. They're not getting psychiatric 
care, they've done time in Folsom for stealing cars. The point 
is, if we're going to talk about resources and redeployment of 
resources, then I really think you have to look at the continuation 
of trying to treat the character disorder, and the MDSO frankly 
confuses the issue, which I think hurts the mentally ill person 
who is acting certainly without as much full faculty as the MDSO. 
And I think a lot of what's gone on here today has been that we 
are trying to split off that group and one of us is thinking of 
the MDSO, while the other one is talking about the real mentally 
ill person who needs medication. I really think that this group 
is coming down to that issue, that we've really got to purify 
this issue so that we can then talk about how to solve it. 
CHAI~N TORRES: How would you solve it? 
MR. YOCKEY: Well, it depends on how muc.O. resources 
you give me. I, frankly, would want to find out within the: MDSO 
as we did with the limited 
how many people, and is there a type that we can really diagnose 
and do something for, and for example, at Atascadero in a study 
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that was published we found that the male pedophile, that is the 
sex offender who molests male children, who went to Atascadero, 
had a reoffense rate of approximately B% versus a 24% roughly 
reoffense rate of the same individual who went to prison. Now, 
• 
that is too wide a variation in my mind to be just the selection 
process and secondly, the male pedophile does not do real well 
in prison. He tends to not have a very enjoyable living 
environment there. So t:l1at group you want to tigh_ten down and the 
Department of Health has actually had some legislative proposals 
to type clinically. Do you want t<) throw the whole thing out? 
Do you want to save a piece? You could look at it in that ranqe 
of alternatives as far as that goes. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: We can't look at it in terms of the 
total alternatives because of Proposition 13 and Propositi::m 4" 
As you are preparing your budget now, you are well aware of the 
restrictions that we're going to have to operate under in terms 
of the next fiscal year. Given those parameters, what recommen-
dation would you give to these two cbmrnittees? 
MR. YOCKEY: My personal recommendation, if I had those 
paramet.ers, would be, I would see the Department of Mental Health 
treating tl~ mentally ill, and the Department of Corrections 
caring for the takers, incarcerating the takers in our society. 
I would get rid of the MDSO and put him in prison, not give him 
any treatment, don't try to put that burden on Corrections. It 
doesn't work in the mental health system, how is it going to work 
in pris::m? 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: What do you mean by the takers? 
MR. YOCKEY: The takers, you know, the burglars, and the 
car thieves, and the rapists. Th~y should go to prison, thE!y're · 
takers. Very simplistic. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well then, when we're dealing 
with MllSO's and the category that we were on the verge of creating, 
MDVO this last year and didn't do so, those people I think Cap 
Thompson would say have character sorders, not truly one of 
the DMS categories, but we simply hold them for some period of 
time and then when they've finished their time, simply put them 
# 
back out on the street. That's about what you're talking about 
if you're talking about Corrections? 
MR. YOCKEY: That's correct, except that if they've 
done murder, etc., we have an indeterminate; but yes they are 
all going to walk sooner or later. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, you would support the 
habitual offender bill too? 
MR. YOCKEY: No, I don't know that I would because 
I have to deal with it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What's the answer? You put 
them back on the street, the two-time losers on a sexual offense? 
MR. YOCKEY: Typically you go for every enhancement 
you can get, and you throw them back down. I think that's 
occurring right now with MDSO's that have graduated either 
positively or negatively from Atascadero. They come back in 
and they do it again. People don't keep sending them back, they 
throw the book at them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The book is a three-year 
MR. YOCKEY: If you want to legislate something else, 
that's where Cap's point is. That's a social question. If you 
want to talk to me ab9ut the guy who's got a crime run in 
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Corrections, I'm going to resist. I'm already 2% over my 
capacity right now, and the Legislature won't see fit to build 
much, so if you want to give us more, the.n I'm going to say 
gee, I've got a real problem. If you want to talk to me about 
my personal belief, then I would say rather than bastardize 
psychiatry to cover a problem that was created when the Legis-
lature went to determinate sentencing that you go with an 
adjustment to that determinate sentencing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Mr. Tucker, I guess, had a clari-
fication on that point, and then I would like to ask you a 
question. 
MR. JIM TUCKER: I'm Jim Tucker with the American 
C{vil Liberties Union. I think that Mr. Stirling's statement 
really points up how much confusion there is about who we're 
talking about in terms of sex offenses. Of course, the Legis-
lature passed SB 13 the year before last. Now the enhancements 
are not three years for violent sexual offenses. The terms you're 
talking about for repeat sexual offenders, and we're talking about 
violent sexual offenses, are long terms. We're talking about 
over ten years. Now when those people get out, the question is 
are they going to still be a danger? I think nobody knows the 
answer to that. To assume therefore, in that category, or in that 
area at least that there is a problem, it seems to me, of jumping 
way ahead of where we are in terms of information. Most of the 
things that I've read have come down on the side that if you 
kept this repeat sex offender for 16 or 20 years
1
which were the 
terms that they can get under SB 13, by the time they get out 
they're 50 or 60 years old. They're not a danger to society. 
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Now if that turns out to be not true, then of course, it has 
to be addressed. But what we have not done today is define 
it and it has never happened any of the hearings on these 
bills. We've never defined who we're dealing with. It's easy to 
take out a newspaper clipping and say, gee, in retrospect that 
guy should have been locked up. It's like trying jury ca~;es. 
Mr. Nolan was talking about these gut instincts you get from 
psychiatrists. It's the same thing when you learn to t.ry jury 
trials. You talk to the old man in the locker room, and he 
said never put a postman on the jury, or always take this kind 
of person or always take that kind of person, and you ultimately 
find out, that's not really very true, even though for that guy 
and his gut he would say that's really true. We're tryinq to, 
it seems to me, deal with a problem that we have not defired. 
If we're talking about people getting out of prison at thE end 
of their prison terms, who are not covered by the gravely disabled 
category, then we're talking about a very small number of people 
according to the information this committee's received in the 
past, who people consider to be dangerous. That is, the guys 
that hang upside down in their cells waiting for the day when they 
get released. That's a very small category. If we're talking 
about every person who stands out on the street corner and yells 
at somebody when they go by and acts like the general hershey 
bars of the world, those kind of people, then we're talking about 
thousands· and thousands ~peopre potentially who undoubtedly have 
walked up to somebody and said I'm going to knock your block off, 
and you've walked away from and shrugged your shoulders and said, 
that guy's a nut. OK. Until we define what we're trying to 
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deal with, we're going to continue as we've continued in all 
these hearings, that is w~th a very diffuse sort of response. We 
say, well, what we need is this and what we need is that, and 
I don't think we're going to come up with any kind of a solution 
until we can decide what it is we'Le trying to deal with. Of 
course, we're very concerned that :;omething • s going to be passed 
that is going to cover all of the things that I have just mentionea. 
If you have a statute that covers all of those categories you 
have a statute that will operate in such an arbitrary manner 
that in one county you're going to lock up every illegal alien, 
every person who's a little offbeat, every person who'~ from out 
of county, etc. I don't think that society wants that, and I 
don't think we can afford it. It dissipates the resources that 
deal with the people that I think everybody really wants to deal 
with, and that is what seems to be a small category of people 
who are getting out of prison who still appear to be extremely 
dangerous. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I guess my question is really the 
question of how do we identify the person who really can use 
mental health services? Wouldn't it be ·better from a societal 
point of view to really have the enhancements? When somebody 
does a bizarre act in the beginning, to put that person away, 
and put him away for a long time, and then attempt to define who 
is mentally treatable, and try to work with him no matter what 
they're in there for? 
DR. SCHOCK: I support very much what has been said 
before, I think our whole disccusion is far too diluted. Apples 
and pears and nuts, whateve~ I don't think they belong together. 







personally happen to approve of it because I have seen many 
injustices before, so we say pay a certain price because certain 
people have to be left out. There are many more left in the 
community than we left before. In my opinion no decent study 
has been made. I think we are much to loose on the public 
pressure to make millions of bills and laws. To deal with this 
class I really feel there should be a moratorium for two years _in 
all kinds o-f legislation like that. There also passed a resolution 
recently, SR 59. J think we should throw two or three hundred 
thousand dollars more into it, an~ let somebody study what's 
really going on and come back with some answers. I also feel 
the MDVO concept is a miserable concept, because it paints 
everybody as mentally ill, and people are prejudiced enough. 
I don't think that leads us anyplace. I think there are certain 
mechanisms existing at present that can be used to get these 
people in the system. A couple of Penal Code sections at the 
present time can put somebody in the mental health system when 
his time is up and not feel by changing, to some extent, 5300 
might become convicted of violent crime and extend the period 
and change the criteria for those people who have committed 
violent crimess. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I guess my concern is we have 
enhancements, we look at whether they've committed a crime and 
then they're given a determinate sentence; that we ought to then 
not be so concer~ed about trying to identjfy psop*e-w~hee~a~r~e~-------
---.,.--~. -------- --· 
going to be potentially violent, to try to identify people who 
we can actually do some good for, and then try to take those 
people out of the criminal justice system into the mental healLh 
system, where we can get them better. And if a person has done 
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a violent act in the past, and he's sentenced, then that 
sentencing ought to reflect that, and they ought to be put away 
for a long enough period of time. At the end of that period of 
time, if hopefully they can get better, good, but if they can't 
get better that's about the best we can do is put them away. 
I would assume that the violent person probably will get in a 
fight in prison and probably will have some add on times that 
potentially will be tacked on anyway. The person who's quiet 
and has a character disorder, you'll never pick up anyway, he's 
going to get out or he's going to get out and commit the violent 
crime, so why not try to screen people who can get some help, 
move them out of the criminal justice system into the mental 
health system? Give everybody his determinate sentence, and say 
OK, you screw up while you're in there, you're going to get more 
time, but we're not going to try to judge who's going to be 
violent at the end of that time. You should have gotten that 
tacked on at the beginning. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: It would take several bills 
to do that. I'd like to introduce a member of the Health Committee 
and also Maj0rity Whip of the State Assembly, Assemblywoman 
Maxine Waters. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Guthman: 
MR. GUTHMAN: Dr. Thompson used the term substantial 
mental disorder. I suggest the Legislature may wish to define 
tbe term menta] disorder in a statute or perhaps elect not to 
define it. The diagnostic nomenclature of the American Psychiatric 
Association contains categories of mental illness, and it's fair 
to say that there isn't a person on the face of the earth who 
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doesn't come under one or more of those diagnostic categories. 
So, one thing you might wish to do is define mental disorder, a 
substantial mental disorder, a major mental disorder, a 
personality disorder. Is a mental disorder in remission a mental 
disorder? Those types of issues are things you should consider. 
On the issue of enhancements, or the habitual criminal statute, 
I point out to you that a prior term of commitment as a mentally 
disordered sex offender cannot be used as an enhancement on a 
subsequent offense. One the insue of amenability to treatment, 
the Legislature and the courts have used apparently interchangeably 
two terms: amenability to treatment and benefit from treatment. 
You may want to look at whether or not those terms are different 
or are synonymous. I call to your attention the fact that in 
1979 the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 858 by Senator Russell, 
which is now codified in Section 6316.2j of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code. It specifically provides that amenability 
to treatment is not an issue that must be established at an MDSO 
extension proceeding. Now I'm aware of the Compellebee case and 
the dicta in that case that holds to the contrary, but I'm also 
aware of the fact that the validity of that statute has been 
passed upon by the California Court of Appeal in a case called 
People versus Poggi which upheld the validity of that statute, 
and the Supreme Court denied the defendant.' s petition for hearing. 
Presumably, that is an indication from the Supreme Court that the 
Court of Appeal decision was valid. I 
in making assessments of dangerousness or commitments based upon 
dangerousness, that commitment and control of the dangerousness 
itself is treatment. We've heard a lot about drug therapy. 
There's another concept that therapists use, it's called mileu 
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therapy. Being in the mental institution itself is frequently 
referred to as therapeutic. Controlling dangerousness, when 
dangerousness is the basis for the commitment, is treatment, as 
far as I am concerned, and I don't think that that issue is one 
that we have to hang up on except if, in drafting legislation in 
this area, you are concerned with it, particularly in the LPS 
area. 'l'hen I ask you, what about the significant number of 
persons under LPS conservatorship who are getting nothing more 
than custodial care, no treatment? They are, forgive the use of 
this crass expression, bin cases. They lie in beds, they're tube 
fed, th<~Y have their diapers changed and I'm not talking about 
children. The only treatment they get is custodial care. If 
you want to bring in the amenability to treatment issue into 
LPS, I suggest that you realize the door that you're opening, 
because assuming LPS does have any continuing viability, I think 
that that issue, if it is resolved other than as I am urging, 
it means that the law will be meaningless and useless. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Macomber. 
MR. MACOMBER: Just a brief comment on the enhancement 
issue and the habitual criminal. Studies done over the last two 
years on the determinate sentencing law by the Board of Prison 
Terms indicate that prosecutors and judges are only using about 
half of the types of cases we're talking about, the dangerous 
offenders, repeat dangerous offenders, only using about half of 
the enhJ:ncements that are available to them now. So, ~m feel 
that th~ Legislature has already adequately provided the tools 
to the prosecutors and the courts to take care of a major part 
of this problem. 
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ASS&~BLYMAN BATES: Would you comment on the proposal 
that I made in terms of trying to screen people off and just 
having the enhancements up front; trying to put people away who 
are at that point violent rather than trying to make a determination 
at the end that they're still violent? Don't you pick up people 
in the Youth Authority who are violent, don't they get in fights, 
don't they have trouble, and don't they usually get added on time 
anyway, the truly violent ones the ones who act out? 
MR. MACOMBER: Sure, the people both in Corrections 
and in the Youth Authority who have problems while in the 
institutions lose good time credits and also, if it's severe 
enough, are referred to the District Attorney, or now to the 
Attorney General's Office for prosecution. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Have there been any studies to 
determine that once those people get out, are they more prone 
for violence, people who get time tacked on? 
MR. MACOMBER: Most studies that have a basis in any 
actuarial type projections indicate that those factors that are 
indicative of recidivism are known at the time of sentencing, so 
that your behavior while in the institution has very little 
effect on what you're going to do when you are out. We arr~ 
supportive of what you propose that a person serving a determinate 
term being referred to the Department of Mental Health, which we 
do now on a limited basis. We'd like to do more of that for the 
treatment aspect. 
ASSEMBLYMAN DATES. Would the Administration consider 
preparing some legislation to this effect, that we could carry, 
that we could see? 
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MR. MACOMBER: I defer to Mr. Yockey, but I believe 
the vehicle is there already. As to the need for additional 
legislation, I don't think conditional legislation is what we 
need. We need more beds in the mental health facilities so we 
can refer the cases. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Well, we need to have some sort 
of screening mechanism with which to get them out of there, to 
identify them and have them referred, and then have the Mental 
lle<ll tb Depart_mcnt be prepared to accept Lhern. Cranted tlH· 
conditions, that would take some money, I would assume, to make 
some remodeling, and some security questions. Is there anything 
underway to do that now within the Administration? You're having 
some meetings I understand, but is there a concrete proposal 
going forward where you would get people out of the prisons who 
could be mentally treatable. Are we going to see anything in 
the budget to reflect that in the next year? 
MR. YOCKEY: I would have to defer i:hat question to 
the Department of Mental Health because the l<;gislation would 
relate to their definitions and their populat ons. Our relation-
ship then would be a contractual one. The laVJ that exists now 
enables us to transfer inmates to them for mental health treatment. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Dr. Beermann. 
DR. LOUIS BEERMANN: Dr. Lou Beermann, State Department 
of Mental Health, Office of Forensics. In r&rard to the whole 
issue, I think this revolves around amenabili-ty, and I'd like to 
respond to Mr. Guthrnan's comment regarding amenability. The kind 
of patient he describes is not the kind of person we're talking 
about. We're talking about the sociopath who is a really bright 
person, who skirts around all our treatment. In my conversations 
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with Mr. Yockey regarding this whole issue, we really feel that 
those people who do not take pdrt in treatment, who choose not to, 
they ought to be in prison. We should be dealing with people who 
we can treat. Likewise, we have had some discussion, preliminary 
with Mr. Yockey, concerning the fact that he has some people 
he is having trouble treating. We might be of some assistance 
in that area to him, it would be sort of a tradeoff. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: What about the question about some 
concrete proposals to see people removed from Corrections into 
the mental facilities to get some kind of treatment? Is there 
anything underway that we can point to, that we can see in the 
near future? 
DR. BEERMANN: I think the discussions that we've 
started in the last few weeks would lead to that and hopefully 
very soon. I would hope that we would have some sort of proposal 
along within the next 60 days or so. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Would you present that to this 
Committee and my Subcommittee so we can see that, review that? 
DR. BEERMANN: When we get that far, certainly, we'd 
be happy to. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: Two questions. The first is Mr . 
Macomber, you said that this study said that the enhancements were 
there, but they weren't being utilized. Was there any analysis 
done on why they weren't being utilized? 
's 
a plea bargaining, in other cases the judges feel that the total 
term that their assessments of individuals are adequate in their 
mind for the offense. Maybe that will increase. We seem to have 
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a dramatic increase in our prison population where we're going 
up to a net increase of 50 to 70 a week in California, which 
results in excess of 2500 people being double-celled today. 
Perhaps, that will be also reflected not only in the additional 
people coming to prison but also in application of more enhance-
nlents. We're also now feeding this information back to District 
Attorneys and to Superior Court judges for their information so 
they know what's happening on a statewide basis, which they haven't 
ever had before. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: I would just like to call to the 
attention of the other committee members, that I attended a 
Brookings Institution Conference on prison population. They 
presented pretty persuasive evidence that the length of time a 
person stays in prison has nothing to do with the offense they 
have committed or anything regarding that, but has only to do 
with the amount of the prison that's full. As the population 
declines they've had evidence that parole boards kept people 
longer, as the population in the prisons increases and beds become 
short, they begin kicking people out earlier. It was their feeling 
that the determination of how long a person was kept in prison 
~as based on whether the prisons were full or not. That's 
unfortunate, but true. It seemed pretty persuasive evidence that 
they gave and so Mr Macomber, while you talk about if they're 
really bad they get held longer or we send them to the District 
Attorney or the Attorney General or this or that, the fact of 
the matter is that if the prisons are full, they're going to be 




MR. MACOMBER: I'd have to disagree in terms of 
California. I think we could say it could be true in states 
which still have the indeterminate sentencing law, but in 
California where we have determinate sentencing, the Parole 
Board has no discretion on the release date for any determinately 
sentenced person coming into prison. Absolutely not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about as we were approaching 
the determinate sentencing date, July, 1977, are you saying that 
they were not released quicker to make room for what was expected? 
MR. MACOMBER: I'd say that wasn't the case. I think 
there may have been some effect on individual hearing represen-
tatives as far as looking at the new terms under the determinate 
sentencing law. There were about 1700 people that were released 
earlier than they would have been during that year as a result 
of the determinate sentencing law. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN: And since then, the time off given 
has expanded or contracted based on the population, in other 
words we've got to move some of these folks out so, we don't 
care if they've been causing trouble, give them the time off? 
MR. MACOMBER: The Parole Board has absolutely no 
discretion on granting good time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLJ\N: Well, who does? 
MR. MACOMBER: 'rhc Department of Correcti.ons has some 
authority. 
bureau-
cracy does it, whether it's the left hand or the right hand, 
they're being kicked out early because the prisons are full, and 
they'd be held longer if they weren't full. 
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MR. MACOMBI::I=<: I don't tltink so. I reviewed some 
material on the plane coming down today that indicates that it's 
been roughly the same over the last two and a half years. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, what I'd like to do now, 
Doctor did you have a comment, because I know you've been waiting? 
DR. I~VRITTE: Yes, I think there are still some basic 
irrational assumptions that we haven't addressed. One is that 
we' rc <leal inq with two scpar.:1tc• <md disl:incl: i!>sw.:s, one• Lh<' 
Penal codte·, and the other the civil commitment procedures in 
California. They were set up with two entirely different purposes. 
The involuntary commitment procedure is to get a person who has 
a definable known disorder into a treatment situation, usually 
under the parens patria powers of the state, and we have been 
using standards for that which are not compatible. They're 
irrational. Dangerousness~grave disability have nothing to do 
with mental disorder. The health care system is geared to treat 
illness, not dangerousness. Now, there is a definite function 
that society has to perform and that is to protect society from 
those individuitls who are deemed dangerous to society. That is 
why we are here. It has nothing to do with whether that individual 
is mentally disordered or not mentally disordered. If someone 
breaks the laws that society has constituted, they should be 
punished. Now, if we're dealing with someone who has been deemed 
to be violent, I think treatability or guilt should not even have 
a place in it. If society decides, and that is for the Legis-
lature to determine, that there are certain individuals who should 
be isolated from society because they are indeed dangerous and 
not fit to live in society, be that as it may. Lock them up. If 
they also determine that some of those individuals may happen to 
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be sick or mentally disordered, then it's the humane thing to 
treat them but lock them up from society. I don't think that we 
want to get into the position, because of the determinate 
/sentencing law in California, of letting those people whose 
sentences have come up, shuffling them off to the mental health 
system as a subterfuge from keeping them isolated. Let's address 
the problem if we're going to do it, and that's what my position 
would be . 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, the last 35 minutes that we 
have left I wanted to reserve for Mr. Stirling to toss out his 
suggestion which has been worked out with Ms. Amundson. I think 
Dr. Schock, you touched on it lightly earlier today, and let's 
see how the panel of witnesses feels about this suggestion. Mr. 
Stirling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Chairman, the suggestion was 
made this morning and I thought we'd throw it out as you said. 
For purposes of this division, dangerousness means, one, a 
condition in which a person, as a result of mental disorder, 
presents an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to 
others. In other words, maintain the same threshhold standard 
for those who have not committed any kind of an offense. 
Two, a condition in which a person has been convicted, or we might 
ev£'n a,dd, indicted , to covnr NGI' s and incompetent t.o stand trial, 
convicted of a felony involving death, bodiy ~QCi:t::m or a seX---~ -
offense, and as a result of mental disorder, presents a threat of 
substantial physical harm to others. In other words, where there 
has been an offense committed, the threshhold standard would not 
be imminent threat of substantial physical harm, but would be 
-53-
threat of substantial physical harm. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Thi.3 is the only copy we have so 
Sergeant would you please pass tt around the table of witnesses 
and let them take a quick look tt? 
MS. AMUNDSON: Dr. Mavritte made the point that LPS 
and the Penal Code are two distLnct laws. In fact, the LPS Act 
already contains a cross-over t•) the Penal Code. In 1974, the 
LPS Act was amended so that the definition of grave disability, 
which maintained the old helple~:;s category, also included 1370's, 
who in fact, were dangerous. I:: has occurred to us, and we have 
not had an opportunity to discu:;s this broadly, that there may 
be a viable potential solution i..n adding to the codes a definition 
of dangerous which does not exi!:;t in the definition section and 
creating a double standard for :~hose who have committed crimes 
as opposed to those who have noi:; one containing imminence, and 
I 
one not containing imminence. Host of you know that the 74 
amendment to grave disability w.~s upheld in the California Supreme 
Court on September 15, in the H<·fferber case. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Alright, we have Guthman and Tucker 
talking to one another, there SEems to be discussion. 
MR. GUTHMAN: I'll give you my initial response to the 
proposed language that's passed around. One, I think you're 
just inviting the challenge under the theory of Baxtrum versus 
Herald, I think that's a u.s. Supreme Court decision, arising 
out of a statute in New York where an at:tempt was made to provide 
a different standard for "civil" commitment for persons who are 
completing prison terms than was available for persons who were 
not completing their prison terms. 
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ASS&ii.1BLYMAN STIRLING: David would not the Hofferber 
case have any bearjng on what you resaying now? You'rn talking 
<1b•>1JL <·•pwl prot(~cl iun ba~;i.cd! ty. 
MR. GUTHMAN: Yes, I'm really not certain. I would 
have to reread Hofferber much mon~ carefully, but I think that 
you've got to look at the potenti<tl Baxtrurn versus Herald problem. 
In the second definition you have the laundry list, death, great 
bodily harm, or a sex offense. I would urge that if you are 
going to propose or enact legislation that includes laundry lists, 
you try to make the laundry lists as similar to existin(f laundry 
lists as possible. For example, the legislation upheld in the 
Supreme Court decision of Hofferber used the phrase, a person who 
has been charged with an offense involving death, great bodily 
harm or great bodily injury, or serious threat of substantial 
harm to another. I'm not sure of the exact wording. The NGI 
extension statute has a similar type of laundry list alihough there 
they have specific enumerated offenses. I would encourz,ge you to 
use as much as possible, language identical to similar Etatutes 
that already exist. Lastly, maybe this is just being overly 
technical, I have a concern as to where the word substantial is 
placed in the standard. Substantial danger of harm or a danger 
of substantial harm. I know that Appellate Courts will look 
upon the placement of .the modifier as being an indication of some 
intent by the Legislature and where you have existing statutes 
that provide a mental illness 
substantial danger of harm. If you then enact a statute that 
says a danger of substantial harm that must mean something because 
one of the basic principles of statutory interpretation is that 
the Legislature is presumed to have known what it was doLng, and 
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so I suggest that in putting those modifying words in, unless 
you intended it to mean something different, you use the same 
phrases as already exist. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: I just want to make sure that Mr. 
App is the only ~&ne who hasn't spoken ·today, if you have anything 
to say Mr. App please feel free. 
MR. MEYER: The language is of course quite familiar 
to me since I representc~d Mr. H )fferber, and I am very familiar 
with the Supreme Court's decisLm as a result. It presents, 
howeve~ a number of problems in terms of removing or taking the 
same concepts from the same lanJuage and placing them into the 
5300 section. First of all, you remember that Mr. Hofferber had 
been charged with a crime, to b~gin with. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Why don't you give us the facts very 
quickly? 
MR. MEYER: Ms. Amund;on has already referred to 1370 
(c) (2) of the Penal Code and 5}08 (h) (2) of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code which is a cross-over provision. In effect, it 
provides that when an individua who has been charged with one 
of the shopping list crimes and has, in addition, been found in-
competent to stand trial and who, in addition, has remained in 
custody for treatment because of his incompetency for a period 
equal to the maximum sentence 01 three years whichever is lesser, 
that person may be then crossed over into the civil mental health 
treatment system under a nevvr and different definition of gravely 
disabled which provides just that, that the person has been charged 
with the crime, the charge is still pending, that it is one of 
the shopping list crimes, and that the person remains incompetent 
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to stand trial. That, in fact, is what happened to Hofferber, 
and a few other individuals in the state. There are not many I 
might add. That statute was challenged on a variety of grounds, 
in,:::luding the question of equal protection since the earlier 
cases of Jackson versus Indiana on the federal level, and In Re 
Da'lis on the state level, had said that you may hold a person for 
reasons of incompetency in a treatment setting for purposes of 
reGtoring his competency, only for a reasonable period of time. 
The Supreme Court in Hofferber did not rule the statute unconstitu-
tional, it ruled the statute constitutional. However, it read 
int~o the criteria of 500 8 (h) ( 2) Welfare and Institutions Code, 
the additional requirement that the person must, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, be found, by a jury, to be a substantial threat 
of physical harm to others. That would add a fourth element into 
the criteria of gravely disabled for that particular purpose. 
This, in effect, in the suggesiion of this language, does kind of 
the same thing, and in drafts if you will onto the 5300 definitions, 
5304 definition of dangerous, the element that has been suggested 
by Mr. Stirling. I agree with Mr. Guthman that it invites a 
number of challenges. I would first suggest to Mr. Stirling that 
the addition of persons under indictment or persons charged would 
certainly open a very large can of worms, and would add to the 
opplsition which you have already noticed to your bill. The 
rcu:;on for that is thnt this k:i 11d of commit~mcnt is not in the 
had been charged 
with and found incompetent for a particular purpose in the criminal 
law. These individuals, 5300 individuals, would not have been 
charged by definition. They may have incidentally been charged, 
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but it would have nothing to do with their status under 5300 
Welfare and Institutions. In addition, it provides a series of 
problems which,and I mentioned these in the hearings during tne 
regular session, presents a variety of problems. Once you have 
determined that this individual, because he has committed this 
series of crimes, presents a substantial threat, what are you 
going to do with him? Once again, I would suggest to you that· 
this puts into the Mental Health treatment system those persons 
about whom Dr. Thompson and Dr. Mavritte are objecting. What do 
you do with those individuals, for example, with respect to th,~ 
requirements that you have in your bill for out-patient treatment? 
There is no AB 1229 coverage for those individuals, therefore, 
there is no parole agent or probation officer type of coverage. 
When Lanterman-Petris-Short in the conservatorship sections taLks 
about out-patient treatment, they're talking about requiring the 
conservatee to go to the doctor for treatment in the office. I 
certainly don't think that that would be applicable to those kjnds 
of individuals about whom you are talking here. Secondly, where 
do you put them? Under current law, under 5300 at this time, 
it's the individual treatment facilities who come to court or 
under the mechanism that works in Los Angeles County goes to the 
District Attorney and asks for an additional period. Those 
facilities do not want this kind of individual. You, of coursE~, 
have added now that these people may be committed to the Department 
of Mental Health that Dr. Rucci, is here, I 
believe, and Mr. Towery is here; they are the individuals from 
the respective state hospitals who would be involved. I doubt 
seriously that they would want thi:; population in their respective 
institutions because they don't have the facility for treating 
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them, and indeed, as Dr. Thompson has pointed out there may be nu 
such thing. I believe it was Dr. Mavritte who pointed it out, 
there may be no such thing as treatment for dangerousness as 
such. One other interesting and very thorny problem is that LPS 
requires that a rather extensive and detailed list of person;1l 
civil rights be given to the individual who is under commitme?nt 
or in an institution. These are called patient's rights. They 
appear in the Welfare and Institutions Code, and they refer to 
such things as the person having daily visitors, having the right 
to their own personal belongings, access to telephones, access 
to the outside world, being able to wear their own clothes, which 
is quite a problem for Atascadero State Hospital. How would you 
treat those people in a 5300 setting? Those people, I take it, 
are individuals whom you would want to identify by clothing, and 
who you would not wish to have personal items or personal 
belongings, and in addition, who you would wish to isolate from 
the outside world. Also, I might indicate to you one final 
problem, of which you are aware because we've discussed this in 
the regular session, the case of Suzuki v. Yuen and the various 
cases that the standard for civil commitment outside of the 
criminal area, the standard for traditional civil commitment 
requires the standard that be used for commitments for dangerousness 
appr:-oach what is known as an imminent threat of substantial 
danqer. Some of the cases use the term, immediate threat, but I 
tak(~ that to mean the same 
which appears to be lower than the imminent threat of substantial 
phy~>ical harm, you may be creating a statute which was ab initio 
unconstitutional. You certainly would be inviting challenges on 
that ba~is. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Thank you. Mr. Torres hud to 
step out for a moment. Mr. Stirling, let me defer to you to 
follow up on the original comments that you started prior to Mr. 
Meyer. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That would probably be just 
about the end of the hearing. First, would like to thank each 
of th.e witnesses that came forward tod.ty from their prosp<~cti Vt~ 
areas of expertise to participate in the hearing. I appreciate 
your sincerity and your participation c~nd also those that are 
here, but I have to say something i:o you, my blood pressure has 
been going up since I've been sitt."ng here, and I suspect that 
others at this table have also. There are problems with the 
system that have been coming on for some time. The people that I 
am really concerned about are the innocent victims that are out: 
there, from what I can tell they are not the ones that you 
basically seem to be concerned about. I appreciate that because 
you have your own areas that you're concerned with, but the 
Psychictric Association, Mental Health, Corrections, Public 
Defend(rs, ACLU, nobody wants to take c>n the responsibility for 
coming together and trying to work something out. These problems 
didn't happen just yesterday, they've been coming on for a long 
time. You can read the paper everyday and see the problem, and 
yet who's responsible? We ask one agency and they look to an-
other agency and the other agency says "not me". It's not our 
responsibility in the Legislature to do this. Sornebody's got to 
do it, and that's wqy I've stepped in to try to do it. I can't 
say that this statute is correct, or that it's the right way to 
go. You have poked so many holes in this legislation that we're 
attempting, and yet where are your suggestion:,;'? Whc>rt! an; your 
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suggestions <tbout how to deal with this problem? I can't believe 
that, Gary and Sam, you can't get together and work out some legis-
lation to void the problems that you say are inherent in this 
particular proposal. I can't believe you can't do that, but you 
leave it to us. We're not experts in this area. We're trying 
because we're concerned about the public in general, that's our 
political responsibility, and I'm just very disappointed. This 
bill was introduced back some months ago and we heard the same 
thing then that we hear now, but I don't hear any more constructive 
proposals from you, the experts, as to what is the best way to 
deal with this problem. I'm just disappointed and I'll tell you, 
unless you come up with something, we're going to move with this 
legislation. It may not make it, but we're going to give it a 
real try. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Just a brief comment, I think that 
the problem is that this bill, David, is trying to put out a net 
so big that it's going to catch so few fish and people are 
concerned about that. We don't want to set up a state in which 
we have people who make arbitrary decisions about whether or not 
someone is going to be violent in the future. It's a very 
dangerous thing for our society to embark upon. I think there 
are some answers and some solutions. I hope that Mental Health 
and Corrections will in fact, figure out a way to get the mental 
patients out of the institutions and start treating those people. 
I that w_~_'11~ha ve the -fGresi~ht ··to change --the way·weTre······-~-·· 
currently sentencing, and I think we should do away with diminished 
capacity. I think we should start looking at whether or not a 
person is guilty of committing a crime and once they've done that, 
they ought to be senienced appropriately and if they can be diverted 
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to the mental health sys·tem that ought to happen. The responsi-
bility is really ours. In a way, I disagree with the last speaker. 
I think that we've got to change our policies to say what we want, 
and then these people have to really enforce that and carry it 
out. But for us to say, you figure out who's going to be violent, 
and you tell us who's going to be violent and keep him in jail 
longer is folly. I don't think anybody can do that. We need to 
change the overall structure, and this bill just simply points 
up the broader problem which is that you're trying to put a 
patch on something that needs a major overhaul. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Who has to present the major 
overhaul? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I think that we in the Legislature, 
the combination of the Criminal Justice Committee and the Mental 
Health Committee. Though it's more in the cri.minal justice area, 
we ought to start working together to come forth with a bill. 
I'd like to see representatives come forward from ACLU and from 
other groups who are concerned about the patL:mt' s rights and 
to get involved with trying to figure out how we can do that. 
I'm prepared to do that, I'm prepared to spend my time working on 
that, but we do need help from the public, an1 I think it's really 
ultimately our responsibility to change the oJerall policy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: Tom, in tryinJ to be courteous to 
your last statement, I couldn't disagree more violently with what 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Lock him up. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: That's right, and that's what we 
tried to determine earlier. This proplem cannot be solved with 
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the statements that you just made in a combination with criminal 
justice and mental health. You have to divorce this completely 
between those two committees, if we're going to make any progress 
in this field at all. 
MS. JONES: It seems to me that there's an impression 
that this bill is completely unworkable. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: That's the responsibility of the 
opposition to any bill. They'll make sure that they create the 
illusion of a delusion that it is unworkable. 
MS. JONES: I must disagree. We already have an existing 
5300. AB 2727 attemftS to improve upon that. Now, it really does 
not deal with your criminal or incompetency situations. You have 
.Jther statutes presertly on the books that deal with this. This 
loes cover, though, the mentalJy ill patient who has made a 
;erious attempt or threat of physical harm to another. What this 
J)ill does is lengthen the possibility of treatment from a mere 
}Q days to one year. It provides for review so that we're not 
:alking about a one year absolute commitment, we're talking about 
the possibility of a one year commitment; that if you do go to 
trial, and you do have jurors, and you have all the time, money, 
and expense of preparing a trial, and if the jury finds, beyond 
a reasonable doubt anl unanimously, that you have a patient who 
is seriously mentally ill, and who has fit the guidelines of the 
statute, that person c::an be treated more than an additional 30 
days, without having :o go 
retrying by jury in a1other 90 days. If you can have a one year 
possibility of treatm:mt for someone who is merely gravely 
disabled, who is in a sense just unable to take care of himself, 
vhat is so wrong with a one year period of time for someone who 
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poses a serious threat of physical harm to :.he community at large? 
\AJhy must the pre;>ent Leqislature limit it to merely 90 day:;? 
With the risk of murder and mayhem •Jn the pnblic, you mean you 
only have 90 days, whereas someone 'liTho just can't feed 
themselves •..... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: What about only 12 months? 
MS. JONES: It seems to me that I think the one year 
period of time with appropriate review, like you have in the 
conserv.1 tor ship statutes and provisions is totally appropriate. 
You also have the legislation as presented which provides for 
getting counsel involved in it at the earliest possible time to 
those C•)Unties who lost cases because you don't have counsel 
involvej. I think that's an approrriate part of this statute. 
If you :lid no more than leave thosE provisions in the current 
law, as you already are working wi t.h it, it will enhance, I think, 
its usage in terms of definition, c:ven if we left imminent in. 
I'm sure there are many counties tl at can work on that. I don't 
think we want to scrap AB 2727, because we can't address all the 
problems, I think that the bill addresses Cl limited number of 
patients, and I think if it can be improved on, we ought to do 
it at this time. If we can't do ii: all, at least some of it. 
CHAIRMAN TORRES: Mr. Ba ·:es . 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Mr. Chairman, we're going to probablv 
end up with a dialogue back and forth about the virtues and values 
of AB 27 27. First of all, I think that any tlme you have "threaten" 
in there, it makes it meaningless. When is a person really a threat, 
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and when do you threaten people? I think everyday we make some 
kind of threat. I was threatened a moment or two ago, maybe it 
wasn't a violent threat, but it was certainly a threat. Fortunately, 
I know him well enough to know that he's not dangerous. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FELANDO: If you consider that a threat, you 
ought to go back to the dictionary and look up the definition of 
threat. If you don't like that, I'll see you outside. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I think that's way too broad. Second 
of all, when you start trying to take the LPS and get involved 
in the criminal justice system the way this bill is designed to do, 
I think it destroys the LPS Act. I also think that when you're 
talking about, for instance, the way we currently hold them for 90 
iays, what's the difference between 90 days and a year? If you're 
·3o worried about that person you're going to have the same problem 
1t the end of that year. I think the problem is that, we're really, 
Ln a sense,demagoguing to such a degree that we're attempting to 
~atch a few people when we really need to look at a major overhaul 
)f the whole thing. To try to lump violence and mental health 
:ogether, I think, is a big mistake. We've heard enough testimony 
~oday to indicate that you cannot make that kind of determination. 
ve ought to try to focus on what the person d I believe very 
;trongly that you ought to then sentence them appropriately, and 
.f they're truly mentally ill, and they're truly capable of getting 
;orne help, they ought to get out of the criminal justice system 
;ublic policy than trying to figure out in the end who's going to 
le potentially violent. Let's put them away for what is appropriate 
lY the act, and let's try to work with those that can get better. 
i think that's what we ought to be moving on rather than this kind of 
tpproach. 
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CHAillliAN TORRES: As you can see panel, Mr. Guthman 
and Mr. Tucker are still arguing over some point which I'm sure 
will carry on into the afternoon. To conclude, I think that what 
we have determined here this morning is an attempt to somewhat 
bring to a close the issues that have been confronting this bill 
throughout the legislative process. The purpose for this interim 
hearing was to collate all of this information, all of these 
variables and all of these perspec1:ives into a hearing that resulted 
probably in a therapeutic sessior1 more than a solution gathering 
hearing. But, I think we did, for the first time, hear some 
pretty interesting aspects of what's going on in that courtroom, 
the issue of patients who are under drug medication are being 
determined as to whether or not they did commit that violence at 
that time. We also heard about the amenability to treatment and 
whether or not that's an appropriate response. We also heard, and 
we must sympathize with the issue of psychiatrists who do not and 
should not bear the respons lity of determining violence in the 
future or take the responsibility for doing that, where that 
responsibility ought to lie. I think 's a question Mr. Yockey 
touched upon. Mr. Beermann tried to assure us that some legis-
lative proposals are going to come forward and I want to make 
sure that that happens. So we're going to invite Mr. Beermann 
and Mr. Yockey and any other interested parties into my office in 
Sacramento and lock the door until they come up with a proposal 
consensus on this issue. That is clear to me now more than ever 
before. There are too many variables and too many forces and 
those forces are sincere from each side. Mr. Bates, I know, has 
argued fervently to me and to other members of the Health 
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Committee while this legislation was going through, and Mr. 
Stirling and Mr. Felando and Mr. Nolan on the other side as well. 
So I think what you find here is that there is a consensus in 
that we recognize the problem and now we're going to have to 
resolve it in some way or fashion. Given the restraints of the 
budget, given the restraints of philosophies, given ~the rest:raints 
of voting patterns of the Legislature, and given the impact of 
public opinion, we'll all have a variable on what we seek to do, 
but I think that what you've gathered here today from the panel 
of witnesses and from this committee is that there is a desire to 
address this problem. And I think we're going to do it sincerely 
and forthrightly, and I want to thank all of you for participating 
with us in this discussion, and we look forward to hearing irom 
you again. If there is anyone in the audience who vJanted tCJ 
participate but did not have an opportunity to do so, it is the 
policy of the Health Committee to hold the record open for i:wo 
weeks so that if you wish to submit your own testimony as if you 
would have testified here today or new ideas, they will becC>me an 
official part of the record. You can write to us in care of 
Assemblyman Torres, State Capitol, Sacramento, it will get to us, 
urging your responses. If you can type those responses that 
would be appreciated as well, but if you have something to say 
and would like to incorporate it as part of the record, we would 
appreciate receiving it. Lastly, I would like to thank the 
Madeline and her staff for allowing us to come into St. Johns. 
It is the birthplace of my son, which is a special momentous 
occasion for me, and maybe other occasions in the future. ~a 
-67-
would like to thank St. Johrls for your support and for your 
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Dear Assemblyman Torres: 
SUBJECT: INTERIM HEARING OF OCTOBER 7, 1980 
ON MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 
I AM INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS HEARING AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCO~~ITTEE 
O''l' CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTORS. 
Having considerable interest in the issues, I will not refrain from 
airing my personal thinking where it may transcend the position 
of the Conference. However, in the interest of clarity, the format 
of this presentation distinguishes the consensus of the CONFERENCE 
shown in UPPER CASE fr·om my occasional maverick and perhaps 
avant.-garde approach shown indented and jn lower case. 
MY QUALIFICATIONS: 
1. SINCE 1968 I HAVE BEEN A TREATING PSYCHIATRIST FOR THE LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY PAROLE OUTPATIENT CLINIC WHERE I HAVE HAD INTENSE CONTACT 
AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE ThRGET GR011P IN QUESTION. 
2. SINCE 1974 I HAVE BEEN TWlCE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTORS, 
AND I HAVE BEEN AN ONGOING MEMBER SINCE ITS INCEPTION. 
3. SINCE 1972 I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR PROGRAMS 
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS IN THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH 
SYSTEM, AN ASSIGNMENT THAT WAS PROMPTED BY AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND ,JURY AND DEVELOPED UPON SUBSEQUENT REQUEST 
FROM THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. 
n E PRESENTING PROBLEMS: 
SENTENCING STATUTES, GREAT CONCERN DEVELOPED !\S TO MENTALLY ILL PEHSONS WHO 
ARE ALLEGED TO BE RELEASED "PREMATURELY" IN TilE COMMUNITY WITH THE ASSUMPTION 
OF SURGING RECIVIDISM OF VIOLENCE. BECAUSE THERE IS NOT THE EASY OPTION TO 
RETURN TO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING, MENTAL HEALTH IN CALIFORNIA HAS BEEN 
PERCEIVED AS THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATE SOCIAL CONTROL AGENT. 
I am not aware of satisfactory statistics concerning "menially 
disordered violent offenders" being released in the community. 
I am not aware either of a study of recividism rates within that 
specific target population. Having been intensive involved with 
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parolees for the last twelve years, I wonder whether the number and 
nature of the people released in the community is indeed that much 
different after determinate sentencing. 
Personally, I see the abolition of the indeterminate sentencing lm'f 
as more equitable and humane. The other side of the coin, of course, 
1s an unfortunate loss of flexibility. 
THE FOLLOWING ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS OF THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH 
DIRECTORS, OF SOME l'ROFESSIONALS IN THE CORRECTION DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS 
MY OWN: 
1. MENTAL HEALTH MUST NOT BE MANIPULATED INTO A PSEUDO-JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
e Those concerns are valid. Yet systems can't remain "pure". The 
complex nature of our society and of our institutjons creates 
unavoidable overlays. I believe the issue is to find an acceptable 
compromise where involvement does not gradually lead to loss of 
purpose and identity. 
2. '>'IE OPPOSE TH CREATION OF A NEW CLASS OF OFFENDERS, NAMELY, THE 
MENTALLY DISORDERED VIOLENT OFFENDERS. THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN 
CONTINOUSLY OPPOSED BECAUSE IT IS THE CONSENSUS THAT THE CREATION OF 
SUCH A CATEG•JRY BY INSTITUTIONALIZING THROUGH STATUTE THE LINKING OF 
VIOLENCE WITil MENTAL DISORDER (EVEN ASSUMING SOME INTRINSIC BENEFITS) 
WOUI,D DO GHE!\T HARM TO THE VAST NUMBER OF NON-CHIMINALIZED MENTALLY 
UJ.,WHO CONTINUE TO SUFFER UNDULY BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNITY'S LACK OF 
SOPHISTICATION AND NEVER-ENDING BIAS AGAINST MENTALLY ILL AT LARGE. 
3. A THIRD OBJECTION IS THE FUNDING CONCEPT. THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL 
ME~TAL HEALTH DIRECTORS IS REALISTICALLY CONCERNED THAT WHILE THEIR 
Mt0DATE WOULD BECOME MORE INCLUSIVE, NEW DOLLARS WOULD NOT FOLLOW 
AN ADDITIONAL TARGET POPULATION. 
4. A GREAT CONCERN IS THE VAGUENESS OF THE TER,\1 "MENTALLY DISORDERED". 
THE DEFINITION IS ANTICIPATED TO BE IN THE BROADEST TERMS A~D INCLUDE 
A WIDE SPECTRlJM OF "NON-TREATABLE" ABERRATIONS. PRESENTLY, THE MENTAL 
HEALTH PROFESSIONAL DOES NOT HAVE THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY 
WITH THE SOCIALLY ACTING-OUT CHARACTER DISORDERS AND STRONGLY OBJECTS TO 
AND RESENTS BEING U3ED AS A CONTROL AGENT WITHOUT THE PROFESSIONAL 
CONVICTION THAT THE CLIENTS' MENTAL HE,\LTH CAN BE IMPROVED. 
5. IT [S AGREED THAT THERE IS A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF "TRUE" MENTALLY ILL 
PER:;ONS IN THE CORRECTION SYSTEM. OBVIOUSLY, MANYf1::AGRANT SCHIZOPHRENICS 
ARE NOT FOUND NGI BECAUSE THEY DO NOT MEET THE TEST OR BECAUSE OF PLEA 
BARGAINING OR BECAUSE OF POOR DEFENSE REPRESENTATION. IN MANY CASES, IT 
W01LD BE HARD TO PROVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR OF TJ!flSE 
PF.fJ 'LE HAS BEEN A PHODUCT OF Tl!E1R MENTAL DISOHDEH. WE CANNOT OVEHLOOK 
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THAT ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSIS CAN GO HAND IN HAND, BUT DO NOT 
HAVE TO BE RELATED ~~D OFTEN ARE NOT. THERE IS A CONSENSUS THAT IN MOST 
CASES THE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSIS ARE NOT INTERDEPENDENT. 
6. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE PSYCHIATRIC COMMUNITY IS \~RY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH 
EXISTING MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION. MANY EFFORTS ARE A FOOT TO PATCH 
THE SYSTEM UP OR TO PROCEED TO A TOTAL OVERHAUL. SOME TIME BACK, 1\ 
COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH OF THE CALIFORNIA BAH ASSOCIATJON DEVELOPED 
A NEW CONCEPT (A COPY IS ATTACHED FOR YOUR PERUSAL). IT WOULD LEAVE THE 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL ESSENTIALLY OUT OF THE SOCIAL CONTROL PICTURE, 
CONFINE HIM TO HEALTH ISSUES ONLY AND WOULD ALLOW FOR INVOLUNTARY 
TREATMENT ONLY IN CASES WHERE IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT THE ILL PERSON 
WOULD WA.liiT TO BE TREATED IF HE WERE OF COMPETENT MIND. IF THAT CONCEPT 
WERE IMPLE~lliNTED, COMPETENCE WOULD BECOME THE BASIC ISSUE AND, OF COURSE, 
THERE WOULD BE NO ROOM FOR M.D.V.O. LEGISLATION. 
This approach has prob2bly considerable appeal to the Mental Health 
professionals. The b~tc noire (the caveat) is, of course, the 
definition of COMPETENCE because the professionals might well want 
to argue that not wanting treatment for mental illness is tantamount 
to incompetence. 
7. THE PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS REMAINS A MAJOR BONE OF CONTENTION. 
EXPERTS LINE UP ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONTRO\~RSY (SEE ATTACHED). 
PROFESSIONALS WHO ARE INEXPERIENCED WITH MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 
ARE IN GENERAL MORE CONSERVATIVE. 
My experience says that ''predictors" may err either way but the 
bett:ing average is cnnsiderably superior to "read Tl'( tea leaves". 
I can't refrain from commen t:i ng on many col Leagues' wi 1.1 i ngncss 
--not to say eagnerness-- to predict by recommendini', disposition 
as amici curiae in criminal proceedings or by deciding on "what 
is good for the patient" under the parens patriae concept as 
long as their predictinns do not require ihe acid test in the 
court arena or as 1img as the prediction does not ret them involved 
with an undesirable target population. Very person:d ly, I feel 
that the prediction issue is a red herring. 
8. A NEW APPROACH PROMOTES THE CONCEPT "TREATABILITY". THE CONFERENCE 
IS ASSUMED TO SUPPORT THE CONNOTATION. 
I more esoter1c than it sounds. 
What is the underlying test: 
Diagnosis, chronicity of illness, motivation of the client or 
the therapist; therapeutic expertise, adequacy of' programs, etc., 
etc., etc.?'>? 
ln my opinio11, intr•o<.lucLion of' the tr·eal.ababi]iLy iso-:tw is a 
grievous error- leading to much shearing without g:1thering wool, 
Assemblyman Art Torres 
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in other words, a quagm~re keeping attorneys busy. I plead 
instead for a consensus on relevant diagnoses under DSM III. 
The following are personal observations and an attempt to find a resolution 
to the present problem: 
I am aware that opposition may noi remain successful in negating 
the legislative thrust and perhaps a compromise could be developed 
acceptable to the Legislators as well as the organized Mental 
Health System. Because of the naiure of my work,I am aware of the 
needs of the mentally disordered <•ffenders; I am also familiar 
with the reluctance of the mental health professional to be 
involved with the target group because it is perceived as often 
not motivated and intimidating. However, the target group in 
question will hit the State's and County's streets sooner or 
J ater notwithstanding any footdragging and wiLl be a part of the 
larger pool of local residents needing services. 
\vithout getting involved in the merits of the Insanity Defense, 
the fact must be pointed out that there exists a vast reservior 
of ·seriously mentally ill persons in the Correctional System. 
Identifying those people six months prior to their DSL dates and 
then holding them for social control under the guise of treatment 
is unacceptable. If the mental health profession is to be involved 
in any meaningful way, it must be from the beginning of the person'c 
incarceration. Therefore I could see legidation mandating 
exhaustive evaluation of all persons going into the Correction 
System, of identifying those needing mental health services and of 
segregating those people into appropriate treatment facilities. 
fvlanagement in Correction indicates that acutely ill people cannot 
be treated in a correctional punitive syst<m; others disagree. 
·rhat difference of opinion needs further clarification and is not 
within the scope of this discussion. 
Persons within Correction needing psychiatric treatment thus ought 
to be involved at the earliest possible dat2 (under the safeguard 
of their constitutional rights as per Vitek vs. Jones). The 
determinate sentencing act should enable us to develop feasible 
and practical early treatment plans with th= established release 
time in mind. 
For the inmates who remain "dangerous because of mental disorder" 
even after early appropriate treatment, it wnuld appear that 
existing legislations w1th mwor changes could handle the problem. 
I refer to Sections 2684 and 2960 of the Penal Code in combination 
w~ith an amendment added to the Po~;t Certification SccUon of the 
we:: I Code. I visualize creati.on of a new statute parallel to 
5300 W&I Code, e.g., 5300.1, for those per~ons who were convicted 
of a felony involving substantial bodily harm and who at time of 
DSL date --even after early, appropriate, ongoing mental health 
services-- are still considered dangerous because of specific 
and agreed upon mental disorder diagnose~~ under DSM I J 1. Those 
people could be transferred into the Mental Health System under 
Assemblyman Art Torres 
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>UMMARY 
P. C. 2960 a'ld held under the new proposed Section 5300.1 W & I 
Code Post C-3rtification that would provide for 270 days instead 
of 90 days time frames (if necessary) and would be combined with a 
mandatory o 1tpatient system similar to outpatient statute!·, for 
the judici n ily commit ted (Chapter ~,47, T i l1 c 15}. The ~ sting 
Section 530<J W & I Code et scqui tur would be left intact f,,y, 
the "run-of-the-miJl" L-P-S Type C(>mmunity clients who we1·e 
not convict··d previously of substantial physical harm or \'ho 
have not be·m found previously NGI for such acts. The precedence 
for dealing differently with the mentally ill who have conuni tted 
certain crir~es exists in 5008 H2 versus 5008 H1 W & I CodE and 
its constitutionality apparently was recently upheld. 
rHE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL MFNTAL HEALTH DIRECTORS IS OPPOSED ~~D WILL REMPIN 
lPPOSED TO ANY AND ALL "M.D.V.O." TYPE LEGISLATION. 
'HE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF "HABITUAL CRIMINAL OFFENDERS LEGISLATION" 
llliiCH WOULD COVER ESSENTIALLY THE TARGET GROUP IN QUESTION (I UNDERSTANI THAT 
11TTEMPT WAS VETOED). 
/,NOTHER APPROACH ACCEPTABLE TO THE CONFERE~CE WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF 
DETERMINATE SENTENCING FOR FIRST TIME CRIMES AND INDETERIVIIN.i\TE SENTENCING 
!OR SPECIFIC SECOND OR THIRD TIME REOFFENDERS. 
I don't know whctlH.'I' the¥'(' would ben constitutionaJ challenge to U1 ti. 
formula under the "equal pr·otection" clause. 
My personal perspective: 
1. Oppose "M.D.V.O." legislation because it is a very poor 
excuse for social control. 
2. Put a two year moratorium on legislation concerning the issu,·. 
3. Use SR 59 - Russell by increasing the funding, widening its !;cope 
and extending the reporting date by 12 months to allow for a more 
serious and in-depth study of the alleged problem. 
4. If 1 
(a) habitunl vinl('nt offender legislntion 
or 
(b) put certain vjolent crimes against persons under indefir ite 
sentencing after 2nd or 3rd offense (if constitutional). 
Assemblyman Art Torres 
October 2, 1980 
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P.C. 2684 and P.C. 2960 with new W& I Code Section 5300.1 
as previously described followed by mandatory outpatient 
treatment per Chapter 547, Title 15. 
~ 
ict Subcommittee, CCLMHD 
Statement of Samuel D. Yockey 
('hl1·f l>"l1ll1/ Dir1~cior 
California Department of Corn,ctions 
for the Assembly Health Committee 
October 7, 1980 
In the nine months ended September 30, 11 male felons were placed 
for evaluation and treatment under the provisions of Section 2960 of the 
Penal Code. 
During that period the rate has accelerated with six of the 11 
referred in September. The increase comes about because of a change in 
administrative policy. Until fairly recently most of the persons now 
referred were, instead, transferred to Atascadero administratively prior 
to the expiration of sentence with the idea this would facilitate evaluation 
and treatment. Apparently it did not. 
We expect the September rate will continue with five or six persons 
a month being referred. 
Of the 11 referred this year, three were under observation at the 
end of the period. Of the remaining eight two were hospitalized and one 
was in the conservatorship process. Another agreed to voluntary treatment 
and remained at Napa State Hospital until parole agents and local Mental 
Health personnel arranged a community program. 
Three were discharged at the end of 72 hours and one at the end of 
a 14-day commitment. Each was then placed under active parole supPrvision. 
One remained under supervision f<)r four months and another for three until 
the statutory period of parole e~pired and we, too, discharged them. The 
B 
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other two remain under supervision, but one of them has only been on parole 
a few days now. None was involved in any criminal activity of which we are 
aware. 
One of the two who is hospitalized was convicted of murder in the 
second degree after he shot a man to death as he slept because he was an 
"enemy." The other was convicted of robbery. 
Of the three who were released after 72 hours, one had been 
convicted of kidnapping, another of robbery which had involved rape and 
kidnapping, and the third: petty theft with a prior and battery. 
The pending cases include a man who shot a woman on a train because, 
he said, she insulted him, another convicted of grand theft and the third 
was convicted of sale of a controlled substance, but has a long history of 
mental illness. 
Our primary criteria for referral has been a history of repeated 
violent acts with no change demonstrated in prison. We also refer those 
we feel are gravely disabled. 
To put the number of referrals in context, we would anticipate 
referring five or six a month, less than 75 a year--some of which we would 
not consider dangerous. Our over-all releases in the first six months 
of this year totaled almost 5,700 male felons. 
The small number of referrals and the limited time they have been 
exposed to parole supervision provides little basis for evaluation. However, 
~~-~~-~~~~-~~-~~~~-~~-~~~~-~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
we are not without experience in this area. 
The problem that sparked much of the mentally disordered violent 
offender legislation was the accumulation of mentally ill prisoners under 
the indeterminate sentence. 
• 
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In planning for the required retroactive implementation of the law, 
the Department of Corrections identified about 175 mentally ill prisoners. 
Efforts were made to continue their confinement through involuntary 
hospitalization, but these efforts largely failed. 
Meantime parole agents "'ere given special training in coping with 
psychiatric problems and the Parole Division's psychiatric outpatient 
clinic staff went to the state hospitals and prisons where the persons 
about to be released were locat£•d to review their files and interview 
their prospective patients. One hundred sixty nine prisoners were released 
to parole or discharged and tag9ed for follow-up. 
According to the Attorney General's figures 45 percent had been 
arrested within a year of their release. Many of the arrests were for 
minor alcohol-related offenses, shoplifting, indecent exposure and other 
bizarre behavior, but others wexe serious. According to our records 18 
months after release 17 of the 169 had been returned to prison with a new 
felony commitment. 
Parole agents, local Mental Health personnel and the clinic staff 
lavished a lot of service on thE• individuals--and subjected them to 
intensive surveillance as well. One parolee whose crime was a bizarre 
attempted murder of a man he thought was an enemy agent was delusional at 
the time of release and had thn~atened death to half dozen persons he 
blamed for his imprisonment. A special unit kept him under 24-hour a day 
surveillance for the first week he was out. In addition he attended out-
patient therapy once a "'eek and his parole agent saw him daily for months. 
It has been more than a year no~1 since his release and he has not been 
involved in any known anti-sociHl behavior. 
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Currently there are more than 11,000 felons under parole supervision 
in California. The parole outpatient clinics serve about 1,500 parolees. 
This represents a moderate increase. The clinic staff, statewide, includes 
41 psychiatrists or psychologists, plus consultants. About 20 to 25 percent 
of the parolees served by the clinics are considered psychotic. About 75 to 
80 percent suffer various personality disorders and another 10 to 15 percent 
are so notorious or the crimes so heinous that clinic participation has been 
a condition of parole. 
It is difficult to answer your questions as to the future. There 
have been a number of law changes made that will begin to affect releases. 
Most of them will result in longer prison terms. One increased the period 
of parole supervision. I will discuss these in more detail later. 
A specific change that demands mention here is the 1978 initiative 
that made murder in the second degree an indeterminate life sentence. 
Murder first has for many years been an indeterminate life term with or 
without the possibility of parole or death from time to time. This means 
that there need be no automatic, determinate sentence release for persons 
convicted of murder. 
There have been recent legislative efforts to change the present 
case law relating to diminished capacity. These could have a substantial 
effect on commitment of mentally ill persons to prison. 
Generally, however, we have seen a continuing increase in the 
numbers of persons committed to prison. In 1977 there were about 7,550 
felons newly received from court. The number increased to 9,325 in 1978. 
That was topped with a new record number of about 9,875 last year. If 
1980 continues at the rate of the first six months, this year will exceed 
the prior record high year. 
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If we leave out murder since it is an indeterminate sentence, the 
1979 intake included 326 persons convicted of manslaughter (not count1ng 
vehicular manslaughter), 868 of assault, 390 for rape and more than 2,000 
for robbery. Of the robbers only 62 were convicted of inflicting gre6t 
bodily injury. Eight burglau were also convicted. That gives a very 
conservative total of 1,650 dangerous persons. The robbery figure is a 
particular "soft spot" becaus.e the threat of violence is always there. It 
is also true that the commitment offense does not always represent the 
nature of the crime. 
Previous studies of persons committed for personal violence showed 
that about six percent of them had a history of mental illness. On that 
basis we could expect 100 plus dangerous and mentally ill offenders to come 
into the system annually. 
Another barometer ie the number of admissions to psychiatric hospital-
ization at the California Medical Facility which treats the most acutely-
ill men in the system. 
There were 244 admissions in the last half of 1979. The unit count 
at the end of the year was 332. Persons convicted of robbery made up 21 
percent of the caeeload. This is a smaller percentage than the 30 percent 
of robbers in th- total male felon population. Seventeen percent were 
convicted of homicide--about the same as in the total prison population. 
Another 17 percent were sentenced for 
as the general prison population. Burglary at 16 percent is about the same. 
Sex offenders accounted for ll percent compared with a systemwide total of 
eight. Drug offenders accounted for two percent of the acutely mentally 
ill population, but nearly nine percent of the total prison population. 
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Thus two-thirds of the aclltely il. were committed for crimes 
again:;t per 30ns. 
A two year follow-up of the 76 4 77 reletses from the acute 
psych,atric hospital showed a return t} prison rate of 25 to 30 percent. 
dowev·~r, only 10 percent were returned with a ileW felony commitment. 
:::ould be said that two persons were rel ~ased "p ·ematurely" because they 
:::ommi ·:ted a 10ther felony. Telling whi ::h ones o~re which is a matter of 
~rave impor:ance and of great difficulty. 
It 
The other 15 to 20 percent ret 1rns wer·~ for violation of parole 
::ondi .ions--sometimes involving a new :rime fo: which there was nc 
;>rosec:ution. More often in this kind ·>f case, the return is for psychiatri-:: 




Since the determinate sentence was enacted, the Legislature has 
repeatedly lengthened prison terms for many offenses substantially. This 
has lessened but not eliminated the possibility of premature release. It 
has also possibly created another problem of retaining some prisoners too 
long. 
The Determinate Sentence Law, enacted in 1976, was modified by 
AB 476 before it went into effect July 1, 1977. 
Much of AB 476 was designed to prevent the premature release of 
prisoners whose indeterminate terms were to be retroactively changed to 
determinate terms in accord with the provisions of the Determinate Sentence 
Act. 
Concern over the retroactive application of the act also stimulated 
the first of the many legislative efforts to prevent release of dangerous 
mentally disordered offenders, I discussed earlier. 
A major prospective and continuing effect of AB 476 was the 
strengthening of enhancements. Enhancements are added sentences for 
additional elements of a crime such as being armed during its commission, 
using a firearm, inflicting great bodily injury, taking or damaging large 
amounts of property or having served a prior prison sentence. 
The original Determinate Sentence Act provided a three-year 
enhancement--or additional term--for a person convicted of one of a group 
of specified violent offenses if he had previously served a prison term 
for any such violent feJony. AB 476 added to the list of violent felonies 
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any felony in which the offender personally used a firearm. The bill also 
counted a commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender as a prison term 
if it followed a felony conviction and the commitment was for more than a 
year. 
The following year, SB 709 increased the determinate penalties for 
40 crimes most of which were violent. As you probably know, the Determinate 
Sentence Law provides three specific terms for each offense from which the 
judge must pick the middle unless he finds mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances. Then he can pick the upper or lower 
Although the minimum term was raised in only ll instances, the 
middle term was increased for 38 and all 40 of the maximums were increased. 
Sex crime penalties were very substantially increased. Sodomy and oral 
copulation by force or threat went from a maximum of four years to a maximum 
of eight. Rape went from three, four or five years to three, six or eight. 
The upper term for robbery was raised a year to five years. 
As a result of SB 709 life sentences can be imposed to run consecutively 
with each other or with any other term for a felony. 
The penalty for murder in the second degree, which had been increased 
by SB 709, was further increased by an initiative in 1978 to make it an 
indeterminate term of 15 years to life. That same initiative increased the 
low penalty for murder in the first degree to 25 years to life. It had 
been seve11 to life."i'hus there is no automatic release of persons convicted 
of murder. 
Last year SB 13 again struck hard at sex offenders. It created a 
category of violent sex offenses which included a new crime of lewd and 
lascivious acts with force on a child under 14, rape by force, threat, or 
in concert with others; and sodomy or oral copulation by force or threat. 
The comprehensive bill had a wide variety of effects including 
denying probation to such offenders,penalizing failure to register, 
restricting their placement, and increasing a few penalties. The principal 
effect from the standpoint of premature release was longer terms for repeat 
offenders. 
Where prior law provided a three-year enhancement for persons 
convicted of rape, sodomy or oral copulation by force who had served a 
prison term for a prior violent offense, SB 13 provided a five-year 
enhancement for a person previously convicted (but not necessarily sent to 
prison) of a violent sex offense. If the person convicted of a violent sex 
crime had served two or more prior prison terms for a violent sex offense, 
he would get a 10-year enhancement for each. 
The enhancement for infliction of bodily injury was increased from 
three years to five years for the violent sex crimes. The weapons 
enhancements were also increased if they were involved in a violent sex 
crime. 
SB 13 also took the limit off the number of enhancements that 
might be made to the sentence of a person convicted of a 
and it provided that each of them must be served in full. 
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Up until enacement of SB 13 where there were multiple convictions, 
the court could run them concurrently or consecutively. If consecutively, 
the offense with the greatest penalty was considered the primary term. The 
term for the subordinate consecutive crimes was one-third of the middle 
term plus 1/3 of any enhancement. 
Since enactment of SB 13 the terms are required to be consecutive 
for violent sex crimes when they involve separate victims or the same victim 
on separate occasions. Each term and enhancement must be served in full. 
For example a person who had been previously convicted of forcible 
rape (but not sent to prison) is caught and convicted after raping two 
women while armed with a knife and inflicted great bodily injury on one of 
them would be sentenced--if the judge used the middle term for both rapes--
to 27 years.* If the judge imposed the maximum term it would be 31 years. 
The term like others would be subject to reduction by one third by 
credits for good behavior and participation in prison programs. 
Most recently SB 1892 effective in 1981 has the effect of increasing 
penalties for administering poison with intent to kill, assault with intent 
to murder, attempt to kill public officials, and assault with intent to 
commit any felony other than murder. 
Although parole supervision does not affect the release of a person 
sentenced determinately, it does provide the opportunity to supervise the 
person in the community--and perhaps more important--to return him to custOdy 
for psychiatric treatment and other reasons. 
* Count I rape at the mid-term 6 years plus 3 years for the use of a knife, 
plus five years for injury, plus five years for the previous conviction 
for a total of 19 years. Count II rape at the mid-term 6 years plus 2 
for being armed with the knife for 8 years. Total 8+19=27. 
I 
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Both the length of possible parole supervision and the amount of 
time allowed without a n,ew conviction were increased by SB 1057 enacted in 
1978. The measure increased the parole period for determinately sentenced 
prisoners from one year to three years. It also increased the period a 
person can be reconfined without a new commitment from six months to 12 
months. 
Legislation that has just gone into effect makes it possible for 
parole agents to take persons under their jurisdiction into custody for 
purposes of a 72-hour evaluation. 
I want to emphasize that the period of parole for a determinately 
sentenced prisoner is an add-on. Parole is not early release; it is an 
additional period of control. 
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It is very apparent from listening to testimony offered by witnesses at this hear-
ing today that there is very little agreement as to the possible answer or answers to the 
problem of violent or potentially violent sex offenders heing released from Slate facilities 
and allowing them to run free upon the streets of our sL1te. 
It iS,at best, extremely difficult and complicated to effect legislation which would 
remove, to a greater extent, those sex offenders which are deemed "incurable" by Stnte 
standards and not, in tt1e process infringe upon their individual rights of equal protection 
as championed by the ACLU. But on the other hand, there still remains an incredible in-
justice v1hich is forced upon the people of the State in that these "incurables" are free 
to kidnap, torture, rape, and murder innocent children and women at their leizure: because 
the State has ". . • no \'/here to put them." 
Current law, as we understand it, separates criminal and mentally disordered into 
three basic areas: (l) criminal, (2) mentally ill but treatable with the goal of curing 
the patient; and (3) untreatable with no expectation of curing the patient. 
The State, in the first two instances, provides adequate housing and care for the 
first two cate~ories, but has no facilities, care, or budgeted funds for the latter group. 
It is becnur>e IJf thi~> cornhinntion of philnnophicnl. and Pconnrnic conflict that the 
Jalure, or pi~rllaptl r11oru tuthe point, Slaff, in forced to Lurn the latter qeoup lom1e 
qpor1 society without recJBrd to the consequencet>. 
\'Je all know that there is an inequity in how the "incurables" are handled. But how 
oo we remove this inequity and provide reasonable standards of safety for our citizens? 
VICTIMS, a registered Political Action Committee, seeks the following action to be 
taken immediately by State Health Department and the State Legislature: 
~1) An immediate moratoreum on release of all repeat 
California MDSO program until further notice; 
sex offenders under the 
~2) A special investigation by the legislature ::md an independent, non-Staff team 
of psychiatric experts/ to determine the reasons why lloaHh Staff are unable 
to measure with any c~gree of accuracy the degree of mental stability ACTUALLY 
experienced by Atasc;tdero graduates; and 
Legislation preventing the release of "incurables" and provisions made for their 
indefinate life-time treatment at a separate facility. 
We understand that in order to accomplish the last goal, there must be an increase 
in the budget. Post Propositinn 13 does not allow for such a new facility (or use of an 
old facility) if this increases cannot be worked into the current budget. The answer, 
therefore must be found in a sr:ecial tax or other method of funding this special project. 
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Since Atascadero houses <1pproximately 1,000 patients, about 420 of which are deemed 
t-DSOs, it ~~auld appear that a facility would be needed to house about 500 hard-core "in-
curables" on a permanent basi~. Using the cost guide provided by Atascader Staff, it would 
cost the State about 16 Million Dollars for such a facility, provided there is an existing 
structure. If not, the state would need to build such a structure, perhaps through a spec-
ial bond issue. 
The first two goals, (1) immediate moratoreum on release of repeated sex offenders 
under the MDSO prorJram, and (2) a special legislative investigation in assoc-
iation with an independed, nor1-Staff team of psychiatric experts to determine the reasons 
for Staff's rate of failure at Atascadero with regard to MDSOs, are both possible and 
imperative. 
The morateum would be ju~:tified in that the program, though surely benefiting some 
t1)S0s, also gives high possib'lity of substantial danger to the general public as demon-
strated by the examples of Theodore Franks, \~illiam Bonin, Rodney Alcala, etc. There 
should not seemingly be an infringement on the civil liberties of the patients who are re-
fuse:::l release because the State has the authority to determine, in it's sole descretion, 
the criteria for determining 11hen and if a given patient is "releasable" within the struct-
ure nf it's own legislation. Further, such a program presents a clear and immediate 
dang(~r to the public and, thw;ly, continuAnce of this program may certainly expose the State 
to 1 tigations based upon negligence in dealing with "incurable" MDSOs. 
With regard to the investigation by the legislature, the Assembly Health Committee 
sure y has the capibility to supervise this action and since it cannot rely to any reason-
able degree upon the testimony of Staff to cricize itself, the Committee should be open 
to the formation of a non-staff, independent team of psychiatric experb to asssist the 
Comm1 ttee .in evaluating the programs supervised by Staff. Such Cl team would be temporary, 
with service terminating upon completion of it's report to the Committee. Selection of 
this team should be made by members of the Committee or their agents, but not by Staff. 
Many members of Staff at today's meeting admitted openly that more study needs to 
be done and that definitions need to be mutually agreed upon. Though the study is imper-
ative, you will never get Staff to agree upon definitions or criteria for developing a 
workable program for MDSOs, or legislation which will control patient activities. Psy-
chiatry is both emperical and subjective in research and treatment. It is this subject-
ivity which allows for the wide range opinions which, in turn, clouds the issues and 
inhibits solid legislation. 
Therefore, it is VICTIMS feeling that no amount of effort will alter o~ reduce the 
amount of contaminating subjectivity, and that the legislature should concentrate on that 
are ove~ which it has the ability to control - protection of the public. 
The legislature needs to prevent release of "incurablee>". Hmt thic.> is done is not 
subjective in nature, but admir1istrative and economical. If special bonds are required, 
then so be it; we cannot think of any citizen >vho would oppose such a bond issue - the 
..... al tewatLve -fll' ic~ is---te& h-ii}h, meast:rred in the·muitituae Cff -Nfpes;-·t:ortLlres;-l<.fdn appin-gs , 
and murders. 
This kind of administrative effectiveness takes courage because it requires an in-
crease in taxes. But the legislator who supports this stand will benefit from the support 
he or she receives from the public who benefits from this action. Those legislators who 
refuse to support such action will be forced to explain that stand to their constituencies, 
who will be thoroughly educated as to their representative's stand. 
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We are truly grateful to those members of the Committee who have obviously demon-
strated great concern for the public's welfare, particularly Assemblymen Torres, Felando, 
and Stirling. We are confident that under your very strict supervision and diligence, 
this problem will be eliminated before any more innocent citizens are murdered or injured. 
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J. R. ELPERS, M.D. HAROLD E. MAVRITTE, M.D. 
Assistant Director, Programs Director 
974-8114 
October 2, 1980 
Assemblyman Art Torres 
Chairman, Assembly Health Committee 
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Dear Assemblyman Torres: 
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KATHLEEN H. SNOOK 
Assistant Director, Administration 
974-9682 
Attached you will find Los Angeles County's testimony 
prepared for the Interim Hearing of October 7, 1980, 
on Mentally Disordered Offenders. 
Sincerely, 
:II~ ?}l,_~/)J.} 
Harold E. Mavritte, M.D~ ' 
Assistant Director, Programs 
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Attachment 
cc: J. R. Elpers, M.D. 
Ms. Kathleen Snook 
Deputy Directors, DMH 
Executive Committee, CCLMHD 
POSITION PAPER ON MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 
Prepared by 
L. A. County Department of Mental Health 
October 1, 1980 
The Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health is vitally concerned about 
the involuntary detention of violent offenders in the mental health system. 
Rather than attempt to draft legislation addressing these concerns, we would 
propose at this time basic principles that we feel should be considered by the 
Legislature in dealing with this problem. We would welcome and solicit the 
opportunity to work with the Legislature in drafting specific legislation to 
address these concerns. 
The L-P-S Act as originally established was to promote the legislative intent 
as follows: 
(a) To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of 
mentally disordered persons, developmentally disabled persons, and 
persons impaired by chronic alcoholism, and eliminate legal dis-
abilities; 
(b) To provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious 
mental disorders or impaired by chronic alcoholism; 
(c) To guarantee and protect public safety; 
(d) To safeguard individual r1ghts through judicial review; 
(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement 
services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons; 
(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional 
personnel to accomplish these objectives and to prevent duplication 
of services and unnecessary expenditures; 
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(g) To protect mentally disordered persons and developmentally disabled 
persons from criminal acts. 
Although these were and are noble intents, in actuality the L-P-S system is 
an involuntary service system which promotes the social control function of the 
State. Persons are removed from social intercourse basically as a quarantine 
measure. We feel quite strongly, as you do, that the serious public policy 
question presented by the potential premature release of certain dangerous 
criminal offenders must receive proper legislative consideration. We also feel, 
even more strongly, that there is no way to make the L-P-S law and procedures 
rational without dealing with some fundamental assumptions that this law and all 
mental health laws that we know of make asstunptions we believe to be irrational. 
All mental health laws that we know of focus on establishing mechanism for 
involuntarily detaining people who are dangerous to themselves or others or who 
are unable to provide for their own needs. Even greater stress is laid on the 
issues of dangerousness, that we are addressing today, than on that of what is 
called in California "grave disablement". The courts have held that standards for 
commitment to mental institutions are constitutional only if they require a finding 
of dangerousness to others or to self. Logically, the end point of involuntary 
treatment of the dangerous person is the cessation of the inminent dangerousness. 
From a medical point of view this logic is really illogic. It is only logic from 
the legal point of view. The medical profession and others in the health care 
professions justify initiating their services on the basis of illness or disorder 
and the end point of such services is recovery from the illness or disorder, or 
else achievement of maximum benefits fran treatment. 1-breover, the services 
of the health care system, except in medical emergencies, are restricted 
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to the care of consenting, voluntary, adult patients. Involuntary 
care systems do not addr~ss themselves to this matter, for the most 
part. The L-P-S law does not address itself to treatability. 
The L-P-S law, in its efforts to make procedures informal and 
medical ones, makes the mental health professionals the persons whc 
are to detain mentally disordered people on t basis of their 
dangerousness or grave disability. The health pro ssionals are 
thus placed in the role of being agents of police power as well as 
the agents of treatment. This is not a proper role assignment for 
health professionals. Furthermore, the determination of whether 
one's dangerousness is rooted in mental disorder rather than other 
factors can be very difficult to make. For these reasons, there 
is a significant risk of erroneous application of the staridard. 
We are proposing that legal causes for involuntary treatment 
should not be dangerousness or grave disability, but rather competence 
vs. incompetence to make health care decisions. This is not to say 
that society should'not concern itself with the dangerousness of 
mentally disordered people if it wishes to, but only that the 
dangerousness of mentally disordered people, and of people without 
mental disorder as w~ll, should not be confused with health care 
systems and the criteria for their services. Health professionals 
do not treat dangerousness but illness. If society wishes to detain 
~ dangerous people before they perform acts for which they could be 
detained under present criminal law, then it should confront the 
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problems inherent in preventive detention. Moreover, it should 
not treat the mentally disordered differently from others with 
respect to their dangerousness. 
Dangerousness vs. Involuntary Treatment 
Even if a person is utterly dangerous to others or himself 
and refuses treatment, treatment should be forced on the person 
only if the treatment refusal itself is deemed incompetent. For 
those persons who are dangerous to others the criminal justice 
system is the more appropriate means for dealing with such persons. 
At issue in deciding whether to respect a person's hospitaliza-
tion and treatment refusal is his decision-making competence, that 
is, the person's ability, within reasonable, culturally determined 
limits, to attend to and weigh data relevant to the decision whether 
to accept or reject hospitalization and treatment. This type of 
determination focuses on the person's ability to perform the process 
of deciding rather than on the final decision. 
We must remember that the overriding reason for subjecting an 
offender to either punishment or involuntary treatment is social 
defense. Persons are removed from social intercourse basically as 
a quarantine measure,- therefore, unless the State can guarantee an 
' 
individual treatment that will enable him to re-enter society 
it has no right to keep him in quarantine. If no treatment is 
av~ lable, then any restraint must be justified solely upon the 
danger the individual represents to society. Persons retained for 
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their dangerousness alone should be detained in special institutions. 
Mental Health facilities must cease being the repositories of highly 
dangerous untreatable offenders. 
What is needed, under the social defense function of the State, 
is a clear understanding of individual accountability to society, 
of the nature of quarantine for those char d with dangerous acts, 
and the reservation of institutional incarceration to those who se 
an immediate danger to society. The standards of dangerousness 
which will justify continued confinement for those charged with 
dangerous acts must be clear and subject to judicial determination 
with full enjoyment of constitutional rights by the allegedly 
dangerous individual. 
We should not have to predicate the protection of society upon 
either guilt or treatability. Merely the fact that an individual 
has harmed and will continue to harm society is enough to justify 
intervention. We should recognize this social reality and hedge 
societal controls w~th full safeguards so that the liberty of the 
individual will not be unduly compromised. 
The mental health system must be protected against becoming 
the last refuge of unjust social compulsion in the name of morality, 
welfare and health. Our legislatures must determine what types of 
social behavior or status will justify intervention by the State's 
- sanctioning power, whether designated criminal or therapeutic. But 
once public support no longer exists for criminal sanctions regarding 
a given behavior, it will not do to bring that conduct under the com-
pulsory therapeutic realm. 
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In summary, we do not feel that the present system can or 
should be modified without addressing the fundamental irrational 
assumptions that this law and all existing mental health laws make. 
We feel that the only rationale for treating a person against his/ 
her will should be the supposition that she/he would have consented 
to such treatment but for the impaired judgment and rationalfty 
caused by the illness itself. The legal causes for involuntary 
treatment should not be dangerousness or grave disability, but 
rather competence vs. incompetence to make health care decisions. 
However, we strongly feel that one of the main functions of 
society is to prevent violence among its members. Thus, if so-
called mental patients commit violence, or threaten to do so, 
1hey should be treated for what they are--lawbreakers. 
'Dangerousness to others"--if it involves breaking the law is 
the best reason for depriving a person of his liberty. Judicial 
~entencing of lawbreakers does not deprive us of the opportunity 
cf also trying to h~lp them. Even if we accept the argument that 
rrany criminals are mentally ill, it does not follow that they 
should be in mental hospitals rather than in prisons. Mental 
hospitalization of offenders $hould not be, and cannot be, a 
substitute for prison reform or appropriate sentencing standards. 
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ISSUES SURROUNDING DETENTION OF 11ENTI\LLY 
DISORDERED OFFENDERS 
The Department of t1ental Health has the respons-ibility for· providing 
ot· insuring that treatment services and care are prov·tc!Nl to mentally 
disordered persons. This includes the vast majority of "jjJdicia11y committed" 
mentally disordered persons v1ho genera'lly are committed to state hospitals 
or other private or public mental th faci 1 i es appl-oved by a county 
mental health director. The term "judicially committed 11 includes those 
adjudged Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (Pen a 1 Code 1026), Incompetent to 
Stand Trial (Penal Code 1370), or Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders (WIC 6316). 
Given this treatment responsibility and the general purpose of the mental health 
profession, the Department of Mental Health should only be in the business of 
treating persons who are amenable to treatment. The mission of the Department 
of Mental Health is treatment, not detention. V-Je accept the fact that detention 
is obviously necessary when treating some individuals; however, to detain 
someone who is alleged to be dangerous but not amenable to treatment in a 
mental health facility after his/her determinate sentence has expired would 
seem to circumvent the Determinate Sentencing Law and, as a result, could well 
clog the mental health system with untreatable dangerous people. 
There are some people who are violent, dangerous and just plain mean, 
and who are not mentally ill and may not benefit from treatment. If detainment 
is the real answer, alternatives to the mental health system should be developed 
to eliminate the perceived need for costly psychiatric services and staff 
for persons not menta I !y 111, not treatable, bot cent ina ing to be danget ous or 
violent. To commit a dangerous person with a sociopathic personality who is 
at the end of his/her determinate sentence, to a mental health facility for 
"treatment," for whom no effective treatment mode is knorm, \'/CHild have 
a disruptive effect on the treatment efforts of other patients il!ld VIOu1d 
destroy the integrity of the treatment system. 
The Department still maintains that a more effective and less 
costly solution to the problem would be to explore amendments to the 
Determinate Sentencing Law for specific types of cr-imina'ls v1ho exhib-it 
continuous violent and dangerous behavior. What all this leads up to is the 
necessity of meeting, head-on, the issue of amenability to treatment (this 
mainly concerns MDSO's). The main topics which arise under this issue are: 
1. Amenability to Treatment 
Needs to be defined with the clear understanding that this 
is a legal/clinical concept. Tentative discussions with 
experts in this area are underway. In general, suffice it 
to say that amenab-ility to treatment exists on a continuum; 
that is, there are those persons whom most clinicians would 
would agree cou1d be treated successfully (and are) to benefit 
themselves and society. On the other hand, some clients are 
difficult to treat and most clinicians would have little success 
treating them. There are some diagnostic classifications which 
are generally considered to be at one end of the spectrum or 
the other (or some\'lhere in the middle). In any event, the 
decision regarding amenability needs to be made on a case-by-case 
basis \'lith a cleare-r definition of amenability. 
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2. Early Detet·mination of Amenability/Lack of l1menability 
t 
Such determination has already become policy; 
hm>Jevel', thel~e are some problems: l n soM• cases the courts 
have instructed the Department of tlJental Health to "try a 
different program." In o Lher cases tiw l·mSO has been c;tbl £• to 
plea-bargain so as to exclude pr·ison <;s <t ~~ossibility. 
3. Movement from Prison to State Hospital 
Currently, mentally ill persons may be moved from prison to 
state hospital via the PC 2684 process, or, if they reach 
their Determinate Sentence Date, they can be admitted via 
PC 2960, on the basis of a mental illness. No comparable 
system is available for movement in the opposite direction. 
This can be done but only via the courts and recognizing 
problems cited in No. 2. 
Regarding Assemblyman Torres' specific questions concerning judi al 
commitments: l(a) "The number of petitions for exten~ed detention of Penal 
Code offenders at the conclusion of a determinate senteiJce~ and 1 (b) "Of 
these, the number granted.~ 
The i nit i a 1 Pen a 1 Code 1026 extensions v1ere equested ?Y the 
Department of t~enta1 Health on January 29, 1979, in accordance vlith the 
l_r:l__!_e t-1oye_ decision of 1978. Since that time (through October 1, 1980) there 
have been a total of 160 individuals on whom extension~ have been requested. 
Of these, a tota I of 48 requests for extension have been denied. Further 
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examination of these data reveals the following: 
1st Extension Request 
2nd Extension Request 













The first exten'ion requests for Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders 
were forwarded to the Att<,rney General on September 9, 1977. Since that 
date, extensions have been sought on 66 individuals. Of these, a total of 
24 were denied. Further nspection of these data shows: 
Granted Denied Pendi n.9.. 
1st Extension Request 35 22 9 
2nd Extension Request 11 2 2 
3rd Extension Request 5 1 
4th Extension Request 1 
Total 24 
If PC 1026's and MDSO's are combined, we find a total of 226 individuals 
on whom extensions have been requested, and that extensions have been denied 
on 72 persons. 
1{ c) ~'The extent to v1hi ch th~2::_ecommendations from state hose_i ta 1 s 
to the courts for di spas it ion of f.'1DSO' s prove va 1 i d, in terms of repeat 
offenses." 
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We have interpreted this question to mean: I ow many persons 
who have been denied extensions by the courts eased) have subsequently 
been arrested'? 1\s of the date of this n~por-t \ve h;we hr~C'rt unahlP to 
obtain these duta from thP Depat·tment of Justice, howevN> they .;n-e coopet·atir1g 
with us, and we hope to have the required information in time for the 
hearing in Santa Monica on October 7, 1980. 
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BRIEF DISCUSSION OF APPELLATE COUHT !HCISlONS 
CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF N1ENA5I llTY IN ~1DSO 
EXTENSIONS 
P-~~EJ.~. v. ~o_t:!lp_e_l]_e_~_t::~-~("1979) 99 Cal.App.3d ?% (flOV('I!lhc-r- 30, 19/CJ; 
Fifth District; from Kern County Superior Cmnt): 
The case arose prior to the enactment of subdivision (j) of \4e1fare 
and Institutions Code, section 6316.2, and therefore, the decision was based 
on principles of statutory construction applied to thE~ lavr !-hen in existence. 
(Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and harmonized 
if possible, while upholding validity and constitutiona1ity. The Legislature 
is presumed to have knowledge of existing domestic judicia1 decisions. and 
to have enacted and amended statutes in the ·1 i ght of such decision:;..) 
The court reasoned: A finding, beyond a reasonable doubt (feagl~, 
infra), that a mentally disordered sex offender could benefit by treatment in a 
state hospital, or other mental health facility, is required before a person 
may be initially committed to such facility under Helfare and Institut·ions 
Code, section 6316. The "(a)" and "(b)" recommendations under Welfar·e and 
Institutions Code, section 6325 are predicated on the person no longer bene-
fitting from treatment. Subdivision (i) of section 6316.2 places an affirmative 
obligation on the Department to provide treatment for a mentally disordered 
sex offender where commitment has been extended. In order to be consistent 
and to harmonize section 6316.2 with the other parts of the statutory scheme, 
-
a finding that a mentally disordered sex offender ncould benefit" from treatment 
must be made before a mentally disordered sex offender may have his commitment 
extended under section 6316.2. 
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Moreover, the cotH't i nterpretecl ?~_or!J e v. ! C'a 
14 Cal. as holding t VJas constituti just·ifica on 
for committ ng a mentally d;sordered sex o ! i ly, court, ·in a 
footnote (dicta), considered the newly enacted subdivision (j) of Welfare 
and Institutions Code, section 6316.2, concludin0 that, under Fea and 
the reasoning in Compe1leebee subdivision (j) vmulcl appear to be unconstitutional. 
preme Court declined to review this ision. 
People v. Lakey (1980) 102 Cal .App.3d 962 (February 29, 1980; 
Second District, Division One; from Los Angeles Superior 
Court): 
The court af]reed with ~.2.J!IJle1}eeb~e and l casoni ther·ei n, 
reiterating that treatment is the sole constitutional jus fication of the 
mentally disordered sex offender statute, and required treat-
ment should be meaningful. 
Additionally, an issue regarding the defendant's lack of cooperation 
in treatment was addressed. The court held the mentally disordered sex 
offender patient cannot be given 111hat is in essence a veto power, and the peopl~ 
of this State are entitled to insist that the mentally sordered sex offender 
cooperate in treatment programs, so long as there is sufficient evidence to 
shm<J thJt a tr·ea tmen t program exists or can be impl emen at the pi tal 
\'lhich villl give him a !~-~]-~tic_ opportunity to be cured or to improve his 
mental condition. 
The court also discussed subdivision ) of Welfare and Institutions 
Code, section 6316.2 in a footnote as was done in 1 eebee. The same 
conclusion was reached. but this is still dicta since subdivision (j) was not 
applicable to, or unrler reviev1 in ~a_t~. 
£eople v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581 (June 2G, l9E\O; 
S cond District, Division Five; from los Angeles County 
Sc~erior Court): 
The court disagreed \•.litll~orr:oelleebe_E:_and J.::.(_l_~_cy on the iss1rc~ of 
<:menabi1ity. The court's reasoning \'las based on t\vo main thcodes: 
(l) although subdivision (j) was enacted after the proceedings arose in 
J '2..9.9..i., the court interpreted it not to be a ~l!_~n~ in the l avt but a 
clarification of the statute, and section 6316.2 never contained an express 
requirement for a finding of amenability to treatment; and, (2} the reliance 
in Compeleebee and Lakey on Feagl~ was misplaced, since Fe_il_g_}_i'y_ invalidated 
a portion of the prior law (Welfare and Institutions Code, section 6326), 
under \'lhi ch mentally disordered sex offenders cou1 d be committed for an 
indeterminate period to a pri~n, where the treatment facilities and programs of 
a state hospital are not available. 
The court held that the nevi statutory scheme sati ies the requ-irements 
of Feagley because the extension is for a limited period, the person is entitled 
to the rights guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutions for crirr1inal 
proceedings, and the commitment is to a trea~men_!:_ facility obligated to P.rovide 
treatment, not to a prison. 
"As the legislature has recognized, the State has a compelling 
interest in preventing the premature release of dangerous 
persons. As implied by Feaqley, the prisoner and the hospital 
patient are not similarly situated in their conditions of 
confinement, and the Legislature can constitutionally choose 
to provide that a prisoner who has served his term of punish-
ment in prison shall be released, but that a dangerous patient 
confined to a hospital is subject to the extension of his 
commitment whether or not he is found to be amenable to 
treatment." (P. 592} 
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Referring to the extensive discussion i 
22 Cal.3d 7, the court mai ly 
and insane PC 1026) defendants ar·e essentia1ly ',i lra··ly situatccl, 
that there s no requirement stated in insane amenable to 
treatment for purposes of extension. If a findirg of is not 
constitutionally requi insane persons, is it required 
Petition for ng Supreme Court was ed. 
People v. nartin (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 714 (June 27, 1980; 
Second District, Division Five; from los Angeles 
Superior Court): 
court found it unnecessary li 
trial court had made a nding that the e to treatment. 
Ho1:1ever, in a footnote. court t 
lready found section 6.2 not to in to 
on. 
Add·itionally, court ag \tli th rt of Y~ fact 
that a person who resists treatment does not neces ly mean that is 
unamenable to treatment. Finally, the court d in men 
sex offender extension proceedings a 
(a la 
Welfare and Institutions Code, ons 5300 )~mainly the state 
necessa ly provides little oppor patients to commit 
sex crimes but also it Nas rea t a recent d 
be unnecessary 1t1here the initial confinement ted the commission of 
such an act. 
• 
980)(A1though unpublislwcl, of inien:st) 
Dis ct, Division ThrC'C'; from Los /\ngeles 
) : 
The court upheld defendant's ext.en',iCJn under the ·IJ\'.' in existence 
prior to the effective of subdivision ) .. llov:ever ~ the court stated 
probably find subdivision (j) unconstitutional. 
The court suggested that an application to the Supreme Court for 
a writ of habeas corpus would be an effective way of testing the constitution-
a 1 ity of defendant's current commitment under the laH ~_amended_. 'Our Supreme 
Court could then decide whether an individual may be kept c~nfined solely 
because, if released, he would present a substantial danger of bodily harm 
to others. n 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Suprem~ Court was 
c eni ed. 
CONSERVATORSHIP OF HOFFERBER -- A FURTHER CASE 
REGARDING THE "PREr,1ATURE" RELEASE OF DANGEROUS 
MENTJ\Ll Y ILL PERSONS (MURPHY CONSERVATORSHI 
FOR I NCOt~PETE_NT DE FENOANTS) 
Altman v. Hofferber (1980) C.3d 
UffiDaily JournalD.A.R. 2577}; from 
Court): 
(September 15, 1930; 
fngeles County Superior 
This case defendants who have to be incompetent 
to stand al, and v1ho remain incom[Jetent ·indefinitely. After· the maximum 
limit of confinement is reached under Penal Code section 1370, the defendant 
may continue to be confined only by establishing conservatorship under Welfare 
and-Ins tutions Code section 5008(h)(2) (a "t1urphy Conservatorship"). The 
main issue was what proceedings and what findings with regard to incompetence 
and dangerousness are constitutionally required to continue holding defendant 
in confinement in a treatment facility. 
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(1972) 406 u.s. 5, 
section (h)(2) 
findings v;ere on 
from Penal Code sect on 
or renewing a conservatorship 




• or di , the 
s sec on 




unanimous ury," since is 
con nement 
disabled' provisions." 
PC 1369, incompetence 
by a preponderance 
This was a "4- 2 - 1" 
ark concurred 
a 



























ISSUES SURROUNDING 'l'HE C IVl L DE'I'/\ TNHEN11 
OF PEHSONS CONSIDERED MEN'.l'ALLY :I Lt. AND 
DANGEROUS TO OTHERS 
AB 27 27 (Stir: ling) was an at tempt to amc~nd the provisions 
of the Welfare and Ins tutions Code reJating to postceJtification 
procedures for imminently dangerous persons. The proposed amend-
rnents were advanced a:; a partial solution to the problerH of danger-
ously mentally ill persons being released from prison at the c·xpira--
tion of their prison i:erm. 'l'he creation of this current pr·oblcm 
can be traced to the enactment of the determinant sentence legisla-
tion. The problem can also be posed: What ought society ao with 
those persons who have served their term but who are yet. considered 
mentally ill and dangerous to others? 
Current statutes require that upon release such flersons 
be referred to mental health officials for evaluation and Lreatment 
pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. The L-P-S provisions 
have, of course, limitations on who may be civilly detainecf and 
for how long. AB 2727 was an attempt to broaden the L-P-S criteria 
relating to the 90-day postcertification procedures so as to.allow 
the detention of more persons on the basis that they are mentally 
ill and dangerous. 
As is any attempt to modify civil commitment statutes in 
today's society, there are competing interests and difficu t issues 
social, clin al, and 1 - to be resolved. A brief review of 
current postcertification procedures is necessary. 
ures 
The L-P-S Act provides, of course, for various civil 
commitment periods. This testimony will not review California's 
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statutory provisions relating to 72-hour detentions (section 5150, 
et seq.) or certifications for 14 additional days' treatment 
(section 5250, et seq.}. Of particular nterest to this committee, 
it seems~ are the code provisions relatillSJ to postcertification 
procedures for imminently dangerous pen;ons. 'J'hose procedures 
may be initiated during the 14-day cer t.i f icu t ion per iocl. 
Article 6 (commencing with section 5300) of Chapter 2 
of Part l of Division 5 of the Welfare ;md lnst utions Code 
contains the provisions which set forth postccrtification 
for imminently dangerous persons. 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 6, at the 
expiration of the 14-day period of intensive treatment, a person 
may be confined for further treatment not. to excped 90 days if 
the person: 
0 (a) Has threatened, attempted, or flicted 
physical harm upon the person of another after having 
been taken into cus for evaluation and treatment, 
and who, as a result of mental disorder, presents an 
imm nent threat of s tantial physical harm to s, 
or 
"(b) Had attempted or inflicted physical harm 
upon the person of another, that act having resulted 
in his being taken into custody and who presents, as 
a result of mental disorder, an imminent threat of 
substantial physical harm to others." (Welf. & Inst. 
Code § 5300.) 
This additional 90 days of treatment is initiated by 
the filing of a petition in the super court in the coun 
which the facility providing treatment is located for an order 
treatment. 
ur:s 
The petition may be filed at any time during the 14-day 
intensive treatment period by the pro[essional person in charge 
of the facility, or his designee. It is required that the petiLion 
set forth facts supportinq the allegation that the person meets 
• 
When considering the large number of: persons detained 
for 72 hours (71,114 in fiscal year 1978-79) and 14 days intensive 
tr ea tmen t ( 30,506 for that same period) , a number of factors might 
explain the relatively small numLer or per::.~ons detained for 90-
day postcertification intensive treatment. F'or example, the 
statutorf criteria for confinement is substantially ruorr stringent 
than that required for detention for 7 2 hours and 14 day • s treat-· 
ment. County officials who deal directly with this issue have 
indicated that the burden of showing that a person is an uimminent 
threat of substantial physical harm to others" is considerably 
more difficult to sustain than merely showing that a person is 
a "danger to others." Thus, it has been indicated that, in the 
absence of compelling evidence, prosecutors are reluctant to 
expend their resources seeking to have a patient confined for post-
cer tif ica t ion treatment for 90 days. These issues vJere, of course, 
important factors in the development of AB 2727. 
Considerations When Proposing Amendments 
To The 90 Postcertification Procedures 
There are a number of issues which should be carefully 
considered prior to proposing or enacting modifications to the 
90-day postcertification procedures. First, if the attempt is 
to solve or partially solve the problem of dangerous persons being 
released from confinement, it must be remembered that those L-P-S 
provisions are not so limited - they apply to all persons and not 
simply those be' .tng released from cr imincd confinement. Thus, amend-
ments in the attempt to solve one problem may, of course, create 
others. 
"Da erousness" Criteria - One of the most important 
issues in discussing modification of those procedures is what shall 
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• 
be the criteria for determjning dangerousness. As noted, the 
current standard is that the per son mu:-:; t be dancwrous to the 
others." AB 27 27 proposed tba t that s 1 imdard be changed t.o 
require that the person be found to present "a demonst.rated 
danger of substantial physical harm to others." 
There are possible legal problems with such an approach. 
For example, in Suzuki v. Yuen (1980) 617 F.2d 173, the court 
held that in civil commitments based upon danger to self or others 
"the danger must be imminent to justify involuntary commitment.'' 
v. Farrell (1975) 407 F. Supp. 509. In Lessard it was stated: 
"The proper standard is that which requires a finding 
of imminent and substantial danger as evidenced by a 
recent overt act, attempt or threat." (Original 
emphasis.) 
Thus, any attempt to modify the statutory criteria relating to the 
"dangerousness" standard must take into consideration a careful 
legal analysis of those federal cases. 
Overt Act - As indicated hy the current statutory stan-
dards (and as discussed in Lessard, supra), a recent overt act is 
required to civilly detain a person beyond 17 days on the basis 
of dangerousness. This is significant in the current discussion 
because such requirement would not allow the state to civilly 
detain a person solely on the basis that he or she is believed 
to be 
t~stimony as to mental illness and dangerousness, some dangerous threat 
or action by the person is also required. Such requirements would, 
then, prohibit civil detention solely on the basis of old behavior 
-16-
'· .. ' 
and current belief. 
Da erous But lll ·· If t !J(' problem l o be: 
solved ic; the continued detention of persons con~;ider(•d mentally 
r:uch 
a person would be detained for the protection of society, not on 
the basis that they are mentally ill, but on the basis that 
are erous. If this is true, then it must be as , what do 
we do to protect society from those persons who are being released 
from detention who are not mentally ill but who are consider 
quite dangerous? No doubt such persons are relea from state 
prisons every week. In fact, their numbers, no doubt, far exceed 
those considered "mentally ill and dangerous. 11 If the prob 
is protecting society from dangerous persons, then in discussing 
solutions,both categories, the "mentally ill and rous~ and 
"non-mentally ill and dangerous" ought to be considered. To focus 
only upon those persons consider~d "mentally ill and dangerous" 
is to avo the real problem and encourage the popular belief 
that those people who are dangerous and being released from con-
finement are mentally ill. 
Amenabili To Treatment - Just as with judie ~ co~~ t-
ments, even if a person is considered mentally ill and dangerous, 
if that person could not benefit from mental health treatment, 
n that person should not be made the responsibility of mental 
health professionals and administrators. To do so is to burden 
the mental health system with persons who cannot benefit from 
that tern, all to the detriment of those patients who can efit 




Any attempt to "broaden" Californb'~, civfl comntitment procedun:::·s 
in the attempt to ensure that "menta)"Jy ill'' dan ·rous'' pcrsc,r.s vi-11 
remain confined will face serious difficulties both legal and cli~ic2l. 
The courts have set out constitutional principles relating to such civil 
detentions which cannot be responsibly ignored. In addition~ it is nost 
important that mentJl health professionals not be madC' t·esponsiblc for per·sons 
who cannot benefit from mental health treatment. To burden the mental health 
system v1ith such persons would be to the detri1:u::nt of i.Jll pat'ties -- the 
patient would not be helped, other patients would be harmed and "treatment" 
through the costly mental health system would be inappropriately wasted --
all to the general detriment of society. 
If the proper legal means of further detaining the .,dangerously 
mentally ill" is found, then that system must be careful to distinguish 
bet1·1een those "patients" who can and cannot benefit from menta 1 health ser-vices. 
If the person is amenable to treatment, the mental health system is appropriate. 
If that person is not amenable to treatment, then he or she must be confined 
somewhere else. To fail to make such distinctions is to ignore both the 
problem and the consequences. 
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EX TENS ION RI:QUES'J'S 
No. Not Arrested (%) 
33 (72%) 
No. Arrested (%) 
l3 (28%) 
Note: In two ca8cs :t:c·cords J1ave be:> en destroyed, leaving 46 persons 
·in the sample. Of the 13 persons arrpsted, 2 were returned 
to Atascadero. The remaining ll were arrested for a total of 
25 crimes (9 pPople crimes; 12 property crimes; 3 narcotic 
crimes; and 1 weapons crime). 
Welfare and Institutions Code 6316 (t-IDSO) 
No. Denied No. Not Arrested (%) No. Arrested (%) 
8 (57%) 6 (43%) 
Note: Of the originally reported 24 persons on whom extensions were 
denied, only ll~ were actually released. The 6 who were 
subsequently arrested were charged with a total of 19 crimes 
(16 people crimes; 1 property crime; l wf'apons crime; and l 
escape from custody). 
Source: Department of Justice 
Submitted by: Department of Menta 1 Health 
Office of Forensic Services 
October 7, 1980 
Assembly Comnittee on Health 
Testimo~1y regarding placement 
·if former violent patients on 
outpatient status 
The Community Care Licensing Division (CCLD) of the fkpartrnent of ')ocial Set"vices 
is a regu1atory pr·ogram at is responsible for Uw licensure of facilities 
F 
that provide nonmedical out-of-home care to adults and children, including the 
developmentally disabled, foster children, elderly and mentally disordered persons. 
The mentally disordered population we serve comes from State Hospitals, nursing 
homes, or the community but includes fe>v, if any violent offenders. Therefore, 
the Community Care Licensing Division of the Department of Social Services 
would need to be included in the discussion of any plan which would intend to 
place former violent offenders in any out-of-home care faci 1 ities. 
Uur primary concern is that current community care reg11lations do not provide 
~,ufficient standards for staffing, training,program, etc., to ensure the health, 
:,afety, and welfare of the violent offenders themselves, the other residents 
n placement and the community. New regulations would ner.d to be developed 
io address the needs of this specific population. 
In carrying out its regulator-y function, the CCLD establishes, assures compliance 
with, and enforces California Administrative Code, Title 22 Regulations which 
relate to the health, safety, care, supervision, legal and human ri ts of 
children and adults in community care facilities. These facilities are con-
sidered nonmedical because the type of care provided does not include extensive 
medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment. 
The operational focus of licensing is the large group or sector of people, rather 
than the individual in community care facilities. This regulatory ram 
is both protective and preventive in nature, in that, it seeks to reduce certain 
risks and thus eliminate causes of predictable harm _iJl __ ai:~\'il!!~E'-~. 
There are approximately 22,000 residential (24-hour) fi1cil ith:c; c1nd ?·:,000 ddy 
can~ conununity care facilities l ic1•nsed in the St,lt(: oi [;!l fornia. lhr: tyrJr:s 
of clients served include the eldet'ly, foster childr1•n, th 111entillly disdblicd, 
developmentally disabled, physically handicapped, and the alcohol and (Jr'ug 
abusers. The total estimated number of persons presently being s in 
community care facilities is close to 500,000. 
Presently, approximately 20,000 mentally disabled resiaents are served in community 
care facilities. These MD residents primarily include those persons who were 
fonnerly treated in state hospitals and were subsequently discharged vJith a recom-
mendation for placement in a community care facility. The decision to release 
such a patient is ultimately made by a designated physician who is emplo ed b the 
State Hospital. EorJhe- e en. HI a cornfllunity care 
facility, these residents do not rt·quirc extensivP rsycholoc)ical or pc;ychiatric 
treatment on an outpatient ba·;is. Additionally, the n1ajori of the faci1itic,s' 
licensees and employees have not h.1d extensive ttc~ininc;, nor-clothe licensing 
requlations require such trainin~J. As a result, the s·taff C]enerally Clt'C not 
equipped to serve nentally disabletl residents who require continuous treatment 
on an outpatient basis. 
The 1 icensing regulations l~equire community care faci ities to provide care 
and supervision which i ude assistance as wi h activities of daily 
1 iving and the assumption of varying rees of responsib"il ity for the safety 
and wel being of residents. Care and supervision inrlude, should not 
be limited to the llowing activities: 
(a) Assistance in dressing, C)roomin<J, bathinq .. ud otlwr 
personal hygiene; 
(b) Assistance in taking medication as specified in regulations; 
(c) l storing and distri on of medications; 
d) Arrangement of and assistance with med cal and 1 care. 
Transportation to and from the doctor's/dentist's office 
may be included; 
(e) fvlai ntenance of facility curfews for residents; 
(f) Supervision of resident schedules and activi es; 
(g) Maintenance or supervision of resi t ntoni es or· pl'O!H:rty; 
(h) Monitoring food intake or special diets. 
It is evident from the above list that extensive treatment for a mental disorder 
does not constitute any provisions of care and supervision. 
It is our unders ng th purpose of th ttee is to determine 
whether it is feas e to develop plans that permit formerly diagnosed 
violent patients to be treated on an outpatient is, provided the 
superintendent or professional person in charge of the hospital treating the 
patient determines that she wi11 not be a demonstrated danger to others. 
Because patients may be placed in our facil Hies while receiving treatment on 
an outpatient basis, it is crucial that the Conwunity Care Licensing Division 
be given the opportunity to express its concern to this committee. It is 
recommended that Gary Swanson, is1ative Coordinator (916) 5-8956 be 
reques to work th legisl ve consultants in the discussion and 
development any future related legislation. 
nk you for your ttention and the opportunity to address this committee. 
( 
( 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY 19, 1980 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 28, 1980 
AMENDED ASSEMBLY APRIL 16, 1980 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIJRE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2727 
Introduced by Assemblyman Stirling 
March 3, 1980 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON HEALTH 
An act to amend, repeal, and add Sections 5300,5301,5304, 
5305, and 5306 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, relating 
to mental health, making an appropriation therefor, and 
declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect immediately. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL"S DIGEST 
AB 2727, as amended, Stirling (Health). Mental health. 
Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act after the expiration 
of the 14-day period of intensive treatment, an imminently 
dangerous person may be confined for further treatment 
pursuant to court order not to exceed 90 days. Such person 
must have threatened, attempted or inflicted harm on 
another and present, as a result of mental disorder, an 
imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others. 
This biH would for a 3-year period, delete the requirement 
that such person present a threat of substantial physkal harm 
to others and require instead that such person present a 
demonstrated danger of substantial physical harm to others. 
~--nle biU would also authorize the release to outpatient status 
















1 harm upon person of 
2 into custody for evaluation 
3 result of mental 
4 danger of physical harm to 
5 (b) Had threatened, 
6 harm upon the person another, act having 
7 resulted in his or her being taken into custody who 
8 presents, as a result of disorder, a demonstrated 
9 danger of substantial physical to ot 
10 For purposes of this article, "custody" shall be 
11 construed to mean involuntary under 
12 provisions of this part uninterrupted by any period of 
13 unconditioned release from a facility providing 
14 involuntary care and treatment 
15 This section shall eHect 
16 after the eRective date of the amendments to 
17 enacted by the S.tatutes of 1980, on 
18 repealed, unless a later enacted statute, 






20 SEC 1. .5. Section .5300 added to the Welfare and 
21 Institutions Code, to read: 
22 .5300. At the expiration of 
23 intensive treatment, a person 
24 further treatment pursuant to 




to exceed 90 days if 
27 (a) attempted, or 
28 harm upon the person of another after 
29 into custody evaluation 
30 result of mental presents an 
31 substantial physical to or 
32 (b) Had attempted or inflicted upon 
in his 
presents, as a result of 
threat substantial 
33 the person of act 
34 being takt•n into custody and 
35 mental disorder, an imminent 
36 physical harm to others. 
37 For purposes of this article "custody" shall be 
38 construed to mean involuntary under the 




1 involuntary care treatment. l) 
2 This section operative three years 
3 the effective date act by section 
4 enacted. 
5 SEC. 2. Section 
6 Code is amended to 
7 5301. At any time 0 
8 treatment period the pn:ne~ss1ona1 ..,.., ... :nn 
9 facility, or his or her ~--·~A ..... 
lO required 
11 proceedings under this 
12 court in the county which 
13 treatment is located for an order 
14 to undergo an period 
15 grounds set 
16 summarize the facts 
17 the person faHs 
18 5300. petition 
19 describing in detail the behavior 
20 person falls within the standard set Section 5300. ( 
21 Copies the petition postcertification treatment 
22 and the affidavits in support thereof served upon 
23 the person named the petition on as they 
24 are filed with the clerk of the 
25 The petition 
26 
27 Petition for PostcerUfication Treatment a 
28 Dangerous 
29 
30 I, --. ( the professional charge of the 
31 intensive treatment designee of 
32 the the 
33 been 
34 under treatment to certification by \.._ 
35 and hereby petition court for an 
36 order requiring to undergo an additional period 
37 of not to exceed one year, pursuant to the 
38 provisions of Article 6 (commencing with Section 5300) 
39 of Chapter 2 of 1 Division 5 Welfare and 
96 70 
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I allegation (a) __ _ or 
of 2 actually inflicted 
3 anothe-r after 
upon the 
into custody 
4 of mental disorder, 
5 substantial physical 
6 threatened, 
7 harm upon person of 
8 act having resulted or her being taken 
9 into and he or she presents, as a result of 
























This allegation is supported by the accompanying 








during the 14-day 
prpfessional person charge of the 
may petition superior court 
facility providing treatment is 
requiring such person to undergo an 
of treatment on the grounds set forth in 
5300 Such shall the facts 
the contention that the person falls within 
set forth Section 5300. The petition shall 
aHida vits in detail 
96 82 
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1 behavior which indicates that person falls within the t 
2 standard set in 5300. 
3 Copies of the petition postcertification treatment 
4 and the affidavits in support thereof shall be served upon 
5 the person named in the petition on the same as they 
6 are filed with the clerk of the superior court. • 
7 The petition shal~ be in following form: 9 
8 
9 Petition for Postcertification of Imminently 
10 Dangerous Person 
ll 
12 I, (the professional person charge of the 
13 intensive treatment facility) ( designee of 
14 the professional the 
15 treatment facility) in which has been 
16 under treatment pursuant to certification by 
17 and hereby petition court for an 
18 order requiring to undergo an additional period 
19 of treatment, not to exceed 90 days, pursuant to the 
20 provisions of Article 6 (commencing with Section 5300) 
21 of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Division 5 the and 
22 Institutions Code. Such petition 
2.'3 allegation that (a) has 
24 actually inflicted harm 
25 another 
26 evaluation, and by reason disorder, 
27 presents an imminent threat of substantial physical 
28 to others, or (b) attempted or inflicted 
29 physical harm upon the person of another, that ,let having 
30 resulted in his being taken into custody, and that he 
31 presents, as a result of mental an imminent 
32 threat of substantial to others. 












5 This become operative three years 
( c, 6 the eHective 7 enacted. the act by which this section is 
8 3. Welfare and Institutions 






































































4 Code is 
5 5305. Nothing this 
6 superintendent or professional 
7 hospital in which 
8 treated from releasing him or 
9 to expiration of one year when, 
10 superintendent or professional person 
11 person being involuntarily treated no 
12 a demonstrated danger of substantial 
13 others. 
is 
14 Whenever the superintendent or ..,. .. ,,.,...,,. .•. ,,,.."' 
15 in charg<· a hospital providing 
16 treatment pursuant to this article 
17 to the of one year, 
18 professional person shaH 
19 remanded the person treatment. 
20 superintendent or professional 
21 the in which the person is 
22 treated may place person on outpatient 
23 to the procedures and provisions of ...,._,,._u·<J• 
24 5358.6, when in the opinion of the 
2.~ professional person in charge, the 
26 involuntarily will not be a 
27 of substantial physical 
28 status, and will benefit 
29 At any time, 
30 under 5304 
31 rehearing as to 
32 of the for 
33 no further petition 
34 period six 
35 This section 
36 after the date 
37 enacted by the Statutes of 1980, 
38 repealed, unless a later enacted 
39 chaptered before that date, deletes or 
40 SEC 4.5. Section 5305 is added to 





1 Institutions Code, to read: • 
2 5305. Nothing in this article shall prohibit the 
3 superintendent or professional person in charge of the 
4 hospital in which the person is being involuntarily 
5 treated from releasing him from treatm<mt prior to the 
6 expiration of 90 days when, in the opinion of the 
7 superintendent or professional person in charge, the t 1 '' 
8 person being involuntarily treated no longer constitutes 
9 an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others. 
10 ltl11enever the superintendent or professional person 
11 in charge of- a hospital providing postcertification 
12 treatment pursuant to this article releases a person prior 
13 to the expiration of 90 days, the superintendent or 
14 professional person in charge shall notify court which 
15 remanded the person for treatment. 
16 This section shall become operative years after 
17 the effective date of the act by which this section is 
18 enacted. 
19 SEC. 5. Section 5306 of the Welfare and Institutions ,. 
20 Code is amended to read: /, 
21 5306. Neither the superintendent nor the professional 
22 person in charge of the hospital providing one year 
23 involuntary treatment shaH be held civilly or criminally 
24 liable for any action by a person released at or before the , •. 
25 end of a one year period pursuant to this article. ~ .. 
26 This section shall remain in effect only until three years 
27 after the effective date of the amendments to this section 
28 enacted by the Statutes of 1980, and on that date is 
29 repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is 
30 chaptered before that date, deletes or extends the date. 
31 SEC 5.5. Section 5306 is added to the Welfare and 
32 Institutions Code, to read: 
33 5306. Neither the superintendent nor the professional 
34 person in charge of the hospital providing 90-day 
35 involuntary treatment shall be held civilly or criminally 
36 liable for any action by a person released at or before the 






1 SEG 6. The Department 
2 submit a report to the Legislature two years after 
3 effective date of this act on its findings related to this act 
4 with its recommendations concerning whether the same 
5 should be continued, including, but not limited all of 
6 the following: 
7 (a) The number of petitions that were granted 
8 extended detention of Penal Code offenders at the 
9 conclusion of a determinate sentence. 
10 (b) The number of petitions that were not granted for 
11 the extended detention of Penal Code offenders at 
12 conclusion of a determinate sentence. 
13 (c) The number of non-Penal Code offeners detained 
14 for longer than 90 days. 
15 (d) The number of persons placed on 
16 status pursuant to Section 5305 of the Welfare 
17 Institutions Code. 
18 (e) The number of Penal Code 
19 non-Penal Code offenders released prior to one 
20 (f) The number of detained persons released pursuant 
21 to the rehearing procedure under Section 5304 of 
22 Welfare and Institutions Code. 
23 SEC 7. The sum of dollars ( 'l'----t 
24 hereby appropriated from the General 
25 Controller for allocation and disbursement 
26 agencies pursuant to Section 2231 of 
27 Taxation Code to reimburse the 
28 mandated by the state and incurred 
29 this act 
30 ~+: 
31 SEC 8. This act is an urgency statute necessary 
32 the immediate preservation of the 
33 or safety within the meaning Article 
34 Constitution and shall go into immediate effect 
35 constituting such necessity are: 
36 In order that the serious public policy question 
37 presented by the potential premature release of 
38 dangerous criminal offenders receives .,.,.,.,.,. .. """ .... ._.,..,.~ .... 
39 consideration, it is necessary that this act go 
40 imme~dli1~atffe>flvy.-----------------------~. 
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